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GOVERNING HEALTH INFORMATION

CRAIG KONNOTH†
In the last few years, numerous Americans’ health information has been collected
and used for follow-on, secondary research. This research studies correlations between
medical conditions, genetic or behavioral profiles, and treatments, to customize
medical care to specific individuals. Recent federal legislation and regulations make
it easier to collect and use the data of the low-income, unwell, and elderly for this
purpose. This would impose disproportionate security and autonomy burdens on these
individuals. Those who are well-off and pay out of pocket could effectively exempt
their data from the publicly available information pot. This presents a problem which
modern research ethics is not well equipped to address. Where it considers equity at
all, it emphasizes underinclusion and the disproportionate distribution of research
benefits, rather than overinclusion and disproportionate distribution of burdens.
I rely on basic intuitions of reciprocity and fair play as well as broader accounts
of social and political equity to show that equity in burden distribution is a key aspect
of the ethics of secondary research. To satisfy its demands, we can use three sets of
regulatory and policy levers. First, information collection for public research should
expand beyond groups having the lowest welfare. Next, data analyses and queries
should draw on data pools more equitably. Finally, we must create an entity to
coordinate these solutions using existing statutory authority if possible. Considering
health information collection at a systematic level—rather than that of individual
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clinical encounters—gives us insight into the broader role that health information
plays in forming personhood, citizenship, and community.
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INTRODUCTION
Medical research is undergoing its third paradigm shift of the last three
centuries.1 Until the nineteenth century, research mostly occurred informally
in the course of treating a patient and observing outcomes—a physician

1 The approach I describe “highlights a historic shift in medical research and care . . . This type
of study marks a shift not just in the way doctors treat patients but also in how they conduct longterm medical research.” Steve Sternberg, The Precision Medicine Revolution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (June 6, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-06/precision-med
icine-is-changing-the-nature-of-long-term-medical-research [https://perma.cc/9TK7-VDDY].
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learned by doing.2 Subsequently, the clinical trial became the staple of
medical research in the twentieth century.3 The clinical trial remains
important in the twenty-first century, but breakthroughs are increasingly
coming from “informational” or “secondary” research. By this, I mean research
that aggregates information about patients, including physical conditions,
genetic information, treatments, responses, and outcomes.4 This type of
research provides a real-world snapshot at a population-wide level in ways
that are not possible with traditional clinical trials. Data from clinical contexts
are fed back into databases in a “continuous feedback loop,” the analysis of
which iteratively helps to improve clinical and health delivery outcomes.5 The
goal is to create a national information network based on data collected from
providers, payers, or patients by private or public entities.
The collection of such information raises serious ethical concerns because
it imposes special burdens on specific patients whose records form the data
pool for queries and analyses. Even with the best protections, “[n]o security
measures . . . can ever completely safeguard against . . . release of . . . or
inappropriate use of information.”6 Patients therefore face the risk of
2 See Emily A. Largent et al., Can Research and Care Be Ethically Integrated?, 41 HASTINGS
CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2011, at 37, 37 (describing the historical practice of carrying out research in
the course of providing medical care).
3 See Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 76 (2011)
(recognizing that “randomized, controlled clinical trials . . . were the major workhorse of late
twentieth-century biomedical discovery”).
4 While my usage is standard, other scholars prefer different terms. See, e.g., SHARYL J. NASS
ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE:
ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 19 & n.11 (2009) [hereinafter
BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE] (“The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics
has noted that the term ‘secondary uses’ of health data is ill defined and therefore urged abandoning
it . . . .”). This Article is solely about secondary research based on data that is identifiable so that
records about a single patient that were collected from multiple sources and at different points in
time are linkable. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and
Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 130 (2012) (describing a
study that concluded that removing identifier elements from medical data in compliance with
HIPAA’s “de-identifi[cation]” rules “reduced data by 31% and precluded access to information that
is vitally important for research purposes”). The Article does not concern research on biospecimens
or clinical trials.
5 JOE ALPER & CLAUDIA GROSSMAN, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
INTEGRATING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE: HEALTH SYSTEM LEADERS WORKING TOWARD
HIGH-VALUE CARE 13 (2015) [hereinafter INTEGRATING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE]. Here, I rely
on the traditional Common Rule definition of research as “a systematic investigation, including
research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2016). Thus, I envisage research as contributing to the social
good, broadly defined. The definition of research is a complex subject involving academic dispute
and discussion that is beyond the scope of this Article.
6 KATHY HUDSON ET AL., THE PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., PRECISION
MEDICINE INITIATIVE COHORT PROGRAM—BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21st
CENTURY MEDICINE 84 (2015), https://acd.od.nih.gov/reports/DRAFT-PMI-WG-Report-9-11-
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employment or insurance discrimination, reputational loss, or identity theft.7
Individuals also have personal interests in their health information, whether
identified or de-identified, much as they do with property.8 They suffer
dignitary harm when this information is used without their consent. Further,
surveillance of, and information collection from certain groups, can send
certain social messages about them that affect their status. Finally, these
harms, whether real or perceived, may reduce trust in the medical system
generally, exacerbating health problems among those groups.
The key problem is this: new regulations and laws increasingly facilitate
the collection and public use of data of those on public benefit programs,
namely, the poor and the elderly. By contrast, others who do not rely on public
benefit programs can keep their information out of the communal pot while
remaining well-positioned to enjoy the health benefits that follow as the
learning health system gets off the ground.
This Article argues that laws should distribute information burdens across
society in a just manner.9 This entails taking into account the social welfare
of the individual patient where possible when imposing information burdens.
In concrete terms, this requires altering the points at which we collect
information that is made publicly available, focusing less on public benefit
programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and looking to other sources of data.
We must also alter research methods by broadening and—where possible—
shifting, the public data pool that is queried for research. Many of the
solutions that I offer can be realized through simple regulatory changes. I also
offer statutory solutions, although recognizing that those may be far more
difficult to achieve.
Nonetheless, the law often, and with good reason, imposes different
material, dignitary, and autonomy burdens on different groups. The Constitution
and existing statutes provide little basis to suggest changes to how informational
burdens are distributed. However, bioethical precepts, which have historically
shaped research laws and regulations,10 require a more equitable burden
allocation. Accordingly, this Article develops a framework grounded in bioethics
to support health information equity.
2015-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WHK-NWPU] [hereinafter T HE P RECISION M EDICINE
INITIATIVE]. The harms can range from reidentification to the misuse of one’s private information.
7 See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1148 (2011) (noting the
wide concern of privacy invasion leading to “adverse, real-world consequence[s]”); see also Craig
Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 9) (on file with author) (“Privacy intrusions impose status harms on individuals at
the time of the intrusion.”).
8 See infra notes 109–31 and accompanying text.
9 I note here that my critique is only of the laws as written. In practice, the effects of the law
could be counteracted by other forces that are not yet predictable.
10 See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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The ethics of health information research have largely been dominated by
a single value—maintaining individual autonomy in clinical encounters—and
offer mechanisms such as individual consent and privacy protections to
preserve this autonomy.11 This approach offers little purchase for equity
concerns. To be sure, bioethicists reminded us to distribute the burdens of
research equitably a generation ago.12 But those admonishments were offered
with little analysis. And in the years since, research ethics have undergone a
“dramatic change.”13 Today, the field focuses almost exclusively on distributing
the benefits of research and on questions of underinclusion of minorities—rather
than overinclusion.14

11 See Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX
J.L.-MED. 65, 99-100 (2014) (describing the traditional autonomy-centered model of health
information in which physicians are bound by a “duty of confidentiality in curating the[ir] patient’s
health data”); Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV.
385, 401 (2012) [hereinafter Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy] (defining health privacy exceptionalism
as the idea that “health information deserves a higher level of privacy protection than most other
types of data”); see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 4, at 91-94 (noting that many parties are
interested in acquiring the sensitive and personal information from medical records); Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 339 (2007) (listing the requirements of the HIPAA
Security Rule for covered entities, which include “protect[ing] [health] data against reasonably
anticipated threats to its security”); Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late to
Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1497-99 (2002) (recognizing that medical records are
“highly protected” under HIPAA and that privacy is a fundamental value to the health care
enterprise); Nicolas P. Terry, Electronic Health Records: International, Structural and Legal Perspectives,
12 J.L. & MED. 26, 29 (2004) (explaining that “patient interests in confidentiality, privacy and
anonymity” generate tensions “between the key stakeholders and their needs” in the health
information technology domain); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and
Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 689-90 (describing the
Australian HealthConnect system, which “allows the patient (in consultation with the physician) to
control what data are included and who may view it”).
12 See Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192, 23,194 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter
Belmont Report] (naming “justice” as a basic ethical principle particularly relevant to the ethics of
research of human subjects and explaining that “an injustice occurs . . . when some burden is
imposed unduly”).
13 Patricia A. King, Justice Beyond Belmont, in BELMONT REVISITED: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
FOR RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 136, 136 (James F. Childress et al. eds., 2005).
14 Indeed, scholars suggest that the key problem is that low-income populations are
underincluded in databases. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 55, 56 (2013) (“[T]he reality is that billions of people remain on its margins because they
do not routinely engage in activities that big data and advanced analytics are designed to capture.”);
Sarah E. Malanga et al., Big Data Neglects Populations Most in Need of Medical and Public Health
Research and Interventions (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 16-26) in BIG DATA, HEALTH
LAW, AND BIOETHICS (H.F. Lynch et al. eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828954## (arguing that underserved communities, such as
racial and ethnic minorities, have been excluded from many data sets and warning that such exclusion
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Reclaiming equity requires us to assess the obligations the players within
the system can place on each other.15 I first consider these obligations as if the
health information system were a closed world. There, simple, intuitive
norms of reciprocity require a greater degree of equity. The overwhelming
majority of individuals will benefit from health information over their
lifetimes. To conscript the information of and impose material, dignitary, and
status harms on only one group undermines fundamental notions of fair play.
But the health information system is also embedded in a larger set of
social and political institutions against which these equity values should be
tested. Different approaches to these broader institutions apply different
values and obligations throughout society. These society-wide prescriptions
may influence the obligations within particular systems, including that of
health information. I thus take more complex, but nonetheless widely shared
intuitions as given: that the poor and elderly deserve assistance, that in
existing society, the poor and perhaps, the elderly, do not receive the level of
assistance they deserve, and that addressing health information burdens will
alleviate some of these other social harms. I recognize though, that not
everyone shares these theories of obligation. But this is not the place to
defend them at length. I simply show how altering each of my premises affects
my claims about equity to different degrees.
Part I lays out how new laws and policies are facilitating the disproportionate
collection and public use of data. Part II details the kinds of burdens such practices
can impose. Part III provides an ethical framework to assess these inequities. Part
IV then shows what regulatory and statutory levers can be used to render
secondary research more equitable.
Finally, I emphasize that this Article does not address the question of
whether we should collect information—a question which already dominates
the information ethics literature.16 Rather, it accepts as a premise that it is
limits the extent to which health research will benefit these groups). In doing so, they do not mention
many of the developments that I discuss in this Article.
15 I assume here that identifying “obligations” justifies government coercion of individuals into
complying with those obligations.
16 A prominent line of research ethics argues that there is an obligation to participate in
research. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Is There a Duty to Serve as a Subject in Biomedical Research?, 6
IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Sept./Oct. 1984, at 1, 3 (suggesting that those who benefit from
research have an obligation to participate in research); John Harris, Scientific Research Is a Moral
Duty, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 242, 242 (2005) (citing two principles, “do no harm” and “fairness,” as the
sources of a “powerful obligation to pursue, support, and participate in scientific research”
(capitalization omitted)). Even assuming such a duty, questions would still remain about the extent
of that duty, and privacy ethicists argue for—and the law recognizes—various kinds of limitations.
See Craig Konnoth, Classification Standards for Health Information: Ethical and Practical Approaches, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 395, 404 (2016) (proposing “a more calibrated breadth of consent”
in which individuals consent to their information being used “only for research that departs from
the original context of collection [to] a certain [extent],” as distinct from the current “all-or-nothing
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valid to collect health information to serve the numerous goals of the health
information system. Notwithstanding that premise, we must adopt a
framework within which to reorganize privacy risk in ways that are ethical
and just. Where bioethics has sought only to incorporate autonomy concerns
in health data collection, this framework provides a guide for moving beyond
autonomy to equity concerns.
I. INEQUITY IN HEALTH INFORMATION COLLECTION
The benefits of secondary research promise to be numerous. Agglomerating
health records has enabled researchers to identify genetic mutations that
indicate a high risk of breast cancer or Alzheimer’s,17 make changes to drug
choice and administration,18 and develop quality and cost control measures.19
Secondary research promises to battle discrimination and stigma of certain kinds
by revealing health care disparities across populations and the prevalence of
certain conditions.20 It facilitates recruitment for clinical trials21 and enables other

approach . . . [to] provide broad consent for all further research”). But see W. Lipworth et al., Consent
in Crisis: The Need to Reconceptualize Consent to Tissue Banking Research, 36 INTERNAL MED. J. 124,
125 (2006) (noting that more stringent consent requirements may prove to be a burden on
researchers by “creat[ing] an untenable workload and reduc[ing] sample sizes”).
17 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013)
(explaining that Myriad Genetics “found the location of a gene associated with increased risk of
breast cancer and identified mutations of that gene that increase the risk”); Alzheimer’s Genes: Are
You at Risk?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/alzheimers-disease/indepth/alzheimers-genes/art-20046552 [https://perma.cc/XU6C-5ZAK] (“Researchers have identified
a number of genes associated with Alzheimer’s disease.”). For a longer list of genetic diagnoses, see
Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV
1765, 1780 (2010), which discusses mutations that contraindicate the use of the popular blood thinner,
warfarin, and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, GENESIS GENETICS, http://genesisgenetics.org/
pgd/ [https://perma.cc/V3ZB-CBXA].
18 See Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and Future Drug Development and Delivery, 355 LANCET
1358, 1358 (2000) (discussing the role of genetic information in medication decisions).
19 See, e.g., ALEX PENTLAND, TODD G. REID & TRACY HEIBECK, BIG DATA AND HEALTH:
REVOLUTIONIZING MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 31 (2013) (stating that readmissions
correlated with mental depression in Washington D.C. hospitals); id. at 30 (analyzing unnecessary
prescriptions of expensive brand name medication); see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information:
Reconciling Personal Privacy with the Public Good of Human Health, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 321,
322 (2001) (advocating for the collection of health data for, among other things, the facilitation of
cost-effective assessment).
20 See Gregory E. Simon et al., Large Medical Databases, Population-Based Research, and Patient
Confidentiality, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1731, 1732 (2000) (“Data documenting adverse effects of older
antidepressant drugs and long-acting sedative-hypnotic drugs have informed efforts to improve the
quality of psychotropic drug prescribing for older adults . . . .”).
21 See Tracy Stuardi, Helen Cox & David J. Torgerson, Database Recruitment: A Solution to Poor
Recruitment in Randomized Trials?, 28 FAM. PRAC. 329, 330 (2010) (discussing the advantages of
database recruitment for randomized controlled trials).
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means of research when trials are not possible.22 Over the summer of 2016,
the then–National Coordinator for Health Information Technology observed
at an internal medicine research review session that “5 out of 6 [studies] used
[electronic health record] data.”23 Another study finds that three-fifths of
clinical trials use some form of digital health information.24
Only some health data makes it into secondary research because not all
individuals go to the doctor—either because they are healthy or because they
cannot afford health care (but are not poor enough to receive Medicaid).25 A
doctor may also fail to enter information into a health record or transmit
gathered data.
The data that is captured and used are of two main varieties. First, there
is claims data that providers transfer to payers to receive reimbursement. This
includes diagnostic and procedure codes.26 Next, there is electronic health or
medical record (EHR) data. While claims data only contains information about
a provider’s conclusions (i.e., her diagnoses) and treatment procedures,27 the
EHR contains the information on which the conclusion was based—such as
symptoms, behavior, and even genetic information.28 Claims data is mainly
used to assess health care delivery, cost and utilization, and sometimes, quality
22 See generally Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging the Inferential Gap: The Electronic Health Record
and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. w181 (2007) (explaining various shortcomings of randomized
control trials, including that they are too selective and ignore comorbidities, and noting that
secondary research helps to bridge the gap).
23 Darius Tahir, Inspector General on DOD/Cerner Implementation, POLITICO (June 2, 2016, 10:00
AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/06/inspector-general-on-dod-cernerimplementation-onc-transparency-site-tiff-desalvo-on-pulse-check-214610 [https://perma.cc/YU8MXNTY] (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 See Validic, Validic Reveals Findings from 2016 Global Pharma and Biotech Survey on Digital
Health, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:16 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/vali
dic-reveals-findings-from-2016-global-pharma-and-biotech-survey-on-digital-health-300330012.html
[https://perma.cc/9A5Q-XK54] (“According to survey results, over 60 percent of respondents stated
that they have used digital health technologies in clinical trials . . . .”).
25 See JOHN WILSON & ADAM BOCK, OPTUM THE BENEFIT OF USING BOTH CLAIMS
DATA AND ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD DATA IN HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 4 (2014),
https://www.optum.com/content/dam/optum/resources/whitePapers/Benefits-of-using-bothclaims-and-EMR-data-in-HC-analysis-WhitePaper-ACS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XHJ-MLKP]
(explaining that “uninsured patients have no source of claim data”).
26 See HCPCS-General Information, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/coding/
medhcpcsgeninfo/index.html [https://perma.cc/63AV-A4PR] (providing background information
about the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) that health insurance providers
use to process claims).
27 Id.
28 Electronic Health Records, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/E-health/EHealthRecords/
index.html [https://perma.cc/8LQ4-MMMB] (last updated Mar. 26, 2012). As one doctor notes,
“Whew! We think the ICD-10 [diagnostic] coding hierarchy is complex—it’s nothing compared to
[the EHR coding mechanism] SNOMED-CT.” Eden Ware, SNOMED: What It Is and Why It Was Added
to Stage 2 Meaningful Use, HEALTH LANGUAGE (Jan. 25, 2013), http://blog.healthlanguage.com/SNOMEDWhat-it-is-and-Why-it-was-Added-to-Stage-2-Meaningful-Use [https://perma.cc/94E5-NHLF].
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of care.29 It is less frequently used for clinical research. EHR data, on the
other hand, is far more granular and time-limited, and can therefore be used
for clinical research.
Both kinds of data can come from many sources. For example, patients
can voluntarily provide their information to research networks. Alternatively,
payers and providers, both public and private, can collect data and analyze it
themselves or pass it on to other entities for analysis. Laws and policies have
made data from public programs progressively more attractive and available
for public research, while private data is increasingly harder to aggregate.
Although public programs historically made claims data publicly available
for research, they did not collect EHR data. This meant that those seeking
EHR data needed to rely on difficult-to-access private sources. However,
public programs are ramping up EHR data collection. These changes are
coinciding with increased enrollment in public programs and increased access
to data—sometimes including names and social security numbers. On the
other hand, the data of other individuals is being left outside the publicly
available information pot.
A. Low-Income and Elderly Individuals
Data collection policies affecting low-income and elderly individuals are
increasingly being determined by the convergence of two processes.30 First,
more and more data is being collected from individuals in public benefits
programs who tend to be poorer, older, and in worse health.31 For example,
within the last two years, the granularity of diagnostic codes—and therefore
the details about beneficiaries’ illnesses—has increased by more than a factor
of seven.32 Further, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
29
30

WILSON & BOCK, supra note 25, at 3.
Medicaid includes only the poorest individuals. Those below 100% of the poverty threshold
have the lowest rates of insurance coverage while those at or above 400% have the highest rates.
Jessica C. Smith & Carla Medalia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 13 (2015).
31 See Gretchen Jacobson et al., Income and Assets of Medicare Beneficiaries, 2014–2030, HENRY
J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/income-and-assets-ofmedicare-beneficiaries-2014-2030 [https://perma.cc/L9PX-C4C7] (compiling financial data for
Medicare beneficiaries and finding that “most are of modest means”). Moreover, the health of the
elderly tends to be worse. Furthermore, Medicaid is, of course, a means-tested program and
Medicaid recipients are in “poorer health” than the privately insured. Julia Paradise & Rachel
Garfield, What Is Medicaid’s Impact on Access to Care, Health Outcomes, and Quality of Care? Setting the
Record Straight on the Evidence, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://kff.org/reportsection/what-is-medicaids-impact-on-access-to-care-health-outcomes-and-quality-of-care-settingthe-record-straight-on-the-evidence-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/GX2P-KC96].
32 The ICD-9 coding system, used until 2015, had under 20,000 unique codes. However,
reporting parameters are becoming more granular. ICD-10, adopted in 2015, allows the reporting of
close to 150,000 distinct codes. See International Classification of Diseases, (ICD-10-CM/PCS) Transition-
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now mandates the use of electronic health records.33 EHRs include data about
clinical and physiological symptoms, as well as family, medical, environmental,
and social details, including information about diet, employment, exercise, and
alcohol habits.34 Providers must also transmit certain aggregate measures to
centralized registries based on this data,35 with more granularity over time.36
Additionally, the Affordable Care Act ensures that all of this data is collected
from more individuals: in 2015, eleven million additional individuals became
eligible for Medicaid.37
Next, new policies offer “unprecedented” data access and concomitant risk.38
Although Medicare and Medicaid claims data has long been available for public

Background, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd10cm_pcs_background.htm [https://perma.cc/86SAFEBM] (last updated Oct. 1, 2015). ICD-10 also provides an opportunity to capture much greater
specificity about the nature of a patient’s condition, which makes it more useful for research. See
JOSEPH C. NICHOLS, HEALTH DATA CONSULTING, DATA VALUE: BREAKING O LD H ABITS 4
(2016), http://pages.himss.org/WZ0nIVLkG0t3WRg00k1WQ00 [https://perma.cc/7X3A-PH87] (“ICD10 provides the ability to collect even greater detail about the location and type of breast cancer.”).
33 See EHR Incentive Payment Timeline, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providersprofessionals/ehr-incentive-payment-timeline [https://perma.cc/S47K-GMT5] (last updated Mar.
4, 2014) (“Financial penalties are scheduled to take effect in 2015 for Medicare and Medicaid
providers who did not transition to EHRs.”). Despite rumors, the fundamentals of the program
remain despite recent regulatory changes. Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Programs,
CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.
html?redirect=/ehrincentiveprograms [https://perma.cc/H23Z-YMSU] (last updated Feb. 8, 2017). As this
Article goes to press, the public fate of these programs under the Trump Administration remains in limbo.
34 A list of many of these variables in standardized format can be sought in the SNOMED
library at SNOMED International SNOMED CT Browser, SNOMED CT, http://browser.ihtsdotools.org/?
perspective=full&conceptId1=404684003&edition=en-edition&release=v20170131&server=http://browser.
ihtsdotools.org/api/snomed&langRefset=900000000000509007 [https://perma.cc/ED72-PSCZ].
35 See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage
3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62,762, 62,818 (Oct. 16,
2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 495) (announcing a modified reporting requirement
concerning the reporting of electronic public health data to clinical data registries).
36 Clinical Quality Measures (CQMs) usually require reporting of (patients with a certain
condition) / (all patients in certain demographic or clinical group). eCQM Library, CMS.GOV (last updated
Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/
eCQM_Library.html [https://perma.cc/H6W5-X4QN].
37 Robin Rudowitz et al., What Coverage and Financing Is at Risk Under a Repeal of the ACA Medicaid
Expansion, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/what-coverage-andfinancing-at-risk-under-repeal-of-aca-medicaid-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/WCU8-MDM4].
38 See Ben Moscovitch et al., Time to Fix the Black Hole in Medicare Data, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(June 29, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/29/time-to-fix-the-black-hole-in-medicaredata/ [https://perma.cc/2LTR-JTB3] (discussing CMS’s new initiative giving patients, manufacturers, and
researchers access to information from health insurance claims forms).
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research,39 access has been limited. Files with patient identifiers exclude names
and social security numbers,40 and numerous security measures are in place.41
But CMS has opened up data access—from ten datasets that were publicly
available in 2009 to more than 2100 datasets in 2016.42 Likewise, where data
release was previously discretionary, the Affordable Care Act now mandates
such data reporting to the newly created Patient Centered Outcomes Research
Institute to improve clinical and health quality outcomes.43 The Institute has
shown a keen interest in secondary research and data collection from patients and
provider networks, including clinical, genetic, social/behavioral, and demographic
information.44 However, the only guaranteed, mandated source of data comes from
CMS. Once CMS’s EHR data collection initiative is completed, it will be a boon
for the Institute’s programs. The Institute, in turn, is required to disseminate its
research findings for general public use.45 Recent legislation and policy have further

39 The data is made available under 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)–(b) (2012), which authorizes the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to release the data pursuant to regulation. The
Privacy Act of 1974 requires statements of routine uses of the data in the system to be published. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (2012). HHS has issued the appropriate statements with respect to its
various data repositories. One of the routine uses includes “facilitat[ing] research on the quality and
effectiveness of care provided.” Privacy Act of 1974; Report of a Modified or Altered System of
Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 67,137, 67,137 (proposed Nov. 20, 2006); see also Systems of Records, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/PrivacyActSystemofRecords/Systemsof-Records.html# [https://perma.cc/N443-KG2H] (last updated Mar. 2, 2013) (providing a list of
“CMS’s Systems of Records (SOR) as published in the Federal Register”).
40 See Difference Between RIF, LDS, and PUF Data Files, RESDAC, https://www.resdac.org/
resconnect/articles/148 [https://perma.cc/3PSU-MTC4] (last updated Aug. 10, 2016) (explaining
that files categorized as “Research identifiable files” (RIFs) exclude certain information so as to
protect the individual’s privacy). For an example of a state program that also makes Medicaid data
available, see Accessing DHCS Protected Data for Research and Public Health, CAL. DEP’T HEALTH CARE
SERVICES, http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/data/pages/accessingprotecteddata.aspx [https://
perma.cc/CM8F-EPYD] (last updated Mar. 15, 2017).
41 See Research Identifiable Files (RIF) Requests, RESDAC, https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/
request/research-identifiable-files [https://perma.cc/7PSE-BFG2] (noting that CMS’s Privacy
Board reviews all requests for RIFs).
42 Susannah Fox, Health Datapalooza: New Vistas, HHS IDEA LAB, (May 20, 2016),
http://www.hhs.gov/blog/2016/05/20/health-datapalooza-new-vistas.html [https://perma.cc/9XTW-8RLU].
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(3)(A) (“The Secretary shall . . . make available to the Institute
such data collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services . . . .”). See infra text
accompanying notes 263–68 for further discussion of the Institute.
44 In 2014, the Institute developed PCORnet, which consists of thirty-three large private
clinical networks or health systems and patient networks that have already built themselves to
existing capacity. The grants it distributes to enhance collection and coordination are often awarded
only where there is already existing stakeholder support and technological infrastructure. About
PCORnet, PCORNET, http://www.pcornet.org/about-pcornet/ [https://perma.cc/9VM5-C3KL]
(last updated Mar. 7, 2017).
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(8)(A) (“The Institute shall, not later than 90 days after the conduct
or receipt of research findings under this part, make such research findings available to clinicians,
patients, and the general public.”).
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spurred dissemination. As of last year, CMS has started releasing identifiable data
to commercial companies under its new “Innovator” program.46
The ACA and subsequent 2015 legislation expand access by limiting
discretion and requiring CMS to give individual Medicare data to additional
qualified entities.47 Under the 2015 program, CMS has stated it will release
100% of beneficiary data provided the qualified entity is able to leverage and
show use for it.48 This data also includes names and social security
information.49 The program incentivizes greater amounts of data
transmission than first meet the eye: qualified entities will only receive data
if they have obtained data from other sources.50 They may also constitute a
network of organizations rather than a single organization.51 Entities can
access the data for as long as they are part of the program.52 The qualified
entities may release or sell information, including patient names, to suppliers that
have a treatment relationship with the patient or to suppliers that dispute any

46 See Telephone Interview with Waruiru Mburu, Tech. Advisor, ResDAC, (July 6, 2016); see
also Innovator Research, RESDAC, https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/request/innovator-research
[https://perma.cc/C7LH-3KBX] (“Innovators and entrepreneurs may now access CMS data as part
of a research study to create products or tools that they intend to sell or to conduct research that
creates analyses related to their own business needs.”). Until last year, only limited data sets would
be released to these companies. Telephone Interview, supra. Admittedly, unlike other data transmissions,
the Innovator program requires companies to analyze the data using a CMS portal. Id.
47 Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 105, 129 Stat.
87, 133. Most of these changes were put in place to help reform payment methodologies. Indeed, the
Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) has been referred to as possibly “the second
most important law to reform the United States’ health care system after the Social Security
Amendments which created Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.” Niam Yaraghi, MACRA Proposed Rule
Creates More Problems than It Solves, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2016/10/12/macra-proposed-rule-creates-more-problems-than-it-solves/ [https://perma.cc/7JBS-RZJY].
48 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed.
Reg. 76,542, 76,552 (Dec. 7, 2011).
49 See id. at 76,551 (explaining that all claims provided to qualified entities will contain a unique
and encrypted beneficiary identification number). Encryption, it should be noted, consists only of
removing “direct identif[iers]” like name, address, and phone number. Id. at 76,567; see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 401.703(f)–(g) (2012) (describing the same).
50 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed
Reg. at 76,545-46. CMS has declined to provide a fixed threshold on how much outside data is
desirable. Instead, qualified entities are incentivized to maximize data collection. Medicare Program:
Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81 Fed. Reg. 5397, 5399 (proposed Feb. 2,
2016). The recent regulation now seeks to “encourage issuers to submit data . . . to . . . increas[e] . . .
sample size.” Id.
51 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed. Reg. at
76,543. Further, CMS declined to limit qualified entity status to nonprofits and governmental bodies,
opening it up to commercial organizations as well. Id. at 76,544.
52 See id. at 76,559 (requiring that “once an entity voluntarily leaves or is involuntarily
terminated from the program it must destroy or return all CMS data provided . . . within 30 days”).
However, they can reapply every three years. Id. at 76,568.
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performance metric that the qualified entity calculates.53 CMS encourages this
kind of data sharing.54
Because only claims data is currently collected, the nature of the research
projects are limited. However, as its EHR data collection program is
completed, CMS data sources will drive additional forms of clinical research
that now use private data.55 Indeed, the National Academies have called on
CMS to “identify or develop and validate measurement standards for
collection of [yet even] new social risk factors.”56
B. The Privately Insured
Private data collection involves a great variety of configurations. Private
networks have proprietary databases managed by research subdivisions or
outside research entities.57 In spite of innovative uses of data in private
networks, there are three key differences from CMS data policies. First,
although it is difficult to determine how much proprietary research private
entities carry out, anecdotes and conversations suggest that many, if not most,
private entities do not even engage in internal research. Rather, they use the

53 See Medicare Program: Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 5415 (allowing disclosure regarding information about a supplier’s patients). However, CMS
also explains that before releasing either a public or nonpublic analysis, a qualified entity must
inform providers and suppliers of information. Id. at 5399. Suppliers might seek any identifiable
claims data (including names) that are “relevant to the particular measure or measure result” in
dispute. 42 C.F.R. § 401.717(c) (2013). This might potentially permit release of non-patient names
if non-patient information went into creating the particular measure.
54 See Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76
Fed. Reg. at 76,558 (“We encouraged qualified entities to share this data with providers or supplies
upon request.”).
55 Part of the problem is that many entities were unable to determine where to transmit data.
However, in September 2016, CMS confirmed that it is continuing the task of building a list of
public health agencies and clinical data registries that can receive electronic public health measures
under new meaningful use reporting requirements. See CMS to Develop Data Repository for Clinical
Data Registry Reporting, HIT CONSULTANT (Sept. 20, 2016), http://hitconsultant.net/2016/09/20/
cms-to-develop-clinical-data-registry/ [https://perma.cc/J6NK-X2T4] (announcing CMS plans to
develop a centralized data repository to support sharing public health data).
56 THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G., & MED., ACCOUNTING FOR SOCIAL RISK
FACTORS IN MEDICARE PAYMENT 26 (2016). CMS is regularly asked to release additional data.
For example, last year, House Ways and Means Committee leaders of both parties called on CMS
to release more data regarding the mental and behavioral health of Medicare patients in keeping
with CMS’s recent open data efforts, such as data on anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, personality
disorders, and traumatic brain injury. See Letter from Representative Kevin Brady et al., to Andrew
Slavitt, Acting Adm’r., CMS (Apr. 21, 2016), http://goo.gl/KgEiAL [https://perma.cc/EQ47-MB52]
[hereinafter Brady Letter].
57 See, e.g., Epidemiology and Health Services Research Center, GEISINGER CARING, https://www.
geisinger.edu/en/research/departments-and-centers/epidemiology-and-health-services-research-center
[https://perma.cc/3VW2-SWEA] (providing an example of such a subdivision).
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data to provide continuous care as patients circulate among various providers
in the network.
Second, even if data is used for internal research to benefit plan members,
the research is not generally made publicly available. As the Director for
Informatics Research at a prominent medical system explained to me in a
confidential email, CMS makes its data public because “[t]hey need to show”
Congress and others “that they are doing good things, which is why they . . .
are making the data available.” But private entities are known for seeking to
maintain data monopolies.58 As my source explains, “The data has a certain
amount of inherent wealth. The recipient of the data will . . . benefit from
using [or] publishing on the data. If something goes wrong then [private
entities] (and to a certain extent the recipient [or] secondary user of the data)
will be held accountable.” Thus, there is no reason to “give the data to a
competitor who gets the accolades, the grants, [or] a competitive advantage.”59
As two prominent research scientists argue, this results in private, siloed “war
chests of data,” which these entities “enter . . . into systems that are already
optimized (primarily for advertising) to make predictions about individuals.”60
This makes it harder to agglomerate private data for clinical research.
Finally, in the rare cases in which data is passed on to collaborators and
outsiders, unlike CMS data, the data is always stripped of all key identifiers.61
This means that the risk of identification is lessened.
To be sure, until last year, efforts were well underway in some states to
ensure access to the claims information of the privately insured. Almost
twenty states have all-payer claims databases (APCDs) in place, which
require insurers to send data to central state databases for further analysis.62
Such databases have historically been the largest source of private claims data
58 For example, Myriad has the breast cancer gene sequence for thousands of variants, but
unlike other laboratories, it refuses to share it with ClinVar, the government database of diseaserelated gene sequences. Erika Check Hayden, Myriad Genetics Embroiled in Breast-Cancer Data
Fight—Again, NATURE (May 20, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/myriad-genetics-embroiledin-breast-cancer-data-fight-again-1.19953 [https://perma.cc/V22K-ANZL].
59 Id. An example of this is athenahealth’s attempts to address the Zika virus. Athena advertised
how it tracked medical records to track patients who may have the virus. Press Release,
Athenahealth, Athenahealth Partners with Affected Florida Community to Combat Zika Virus (Aug.
3, 2016), http://newsroom.athenahealth.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=253091&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2192379
[https://perma.cc/Z9YQ-DGL7]. But it never actually shared the data with public entities or made
it available for research—that would diminish its advantage.
60 John T. Wilbanks & Eric J. Topol, Stop the Privatization of Health Data, NATURE (July 29, 2016),
http://www.nature.com/news/stop-the-privatization-of-health-data-1.20268 [https://perma.cc/NW2A-LYJF].
61 As mandated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
data is generally only shared if eighteen identifiers are stripped, but limited data sets can be shared
with appropriate agreements in place. See 42 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)–(R) (2011) (listing the
types of identifying information that must be removed under HIPAA). Moreover, entities can hire
a data scientist to certify that the risk of reidentification is minimal. Id. § 164.514(b)(1).
62 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 941 (2016).
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for research.63 States used these databases for research, but also sold deidentified data for commercial purposes to fund these all-payer efforts.64
However, in 2016, the Supreme Court held that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted states from mandatorily
collecting claims data from self-funded plans.65 With this decision, the Court
“bl[e]w an enormous hole in the all-payer claims databases” as two-thirds of
all employees are self-insured.66 In July, the Department of Labor issued
proposals for information collection, but “it is hard to see that the information
[it] proposes to collect . . . would be an adequate substitute for the all-payer
claims database information.”67
C. High-Income Individuals
Finally, those who are wealthier, healthier, or younger—characteristics
which often go together68—are less likely to have health data in the publicly
63 See Sean E. Bland et al., Strategies for Health System Innovation After Gobeille v Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 581, 581 (2016) (“Over the past decade, many states
have used APCDs to capture new and more sophisticated insurance claims and utilization data . . . .”).
64 See Resources: Frequently Asked Questions, APCD COUNCIL, https://www.apcdcouncil.org/
frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/23M6-C6TV] (“Agencies with laws and policies that
permit the release of standard de-identified and research APCD analytic files can generate revenues from the
sales of these products, with the appropriate release agreements and research review approvals.”).
65 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947.
66 Nicholas Bagley, The Supreme Court’s Wrongheaded Decision in Gobeille, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-supremecourts-wrongheaded-decision-in-gobeille/ [https://perma.cc/JKH5-LUP2]. This is the majority
view. See e.g., Bland et al., supra note 63 (arguing that the Gobeille decision “may undermine
opportunities for health system innovation” and proposing solutions to address the problem). But a
minority view suggests that the decision may not be so fatal. See David Newman et al., Losing the
A
‘ ll’ In All-Payer Claims Databases, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 18, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2016/07/18/losing-the-all-in-all-payer-claims-databases/ [https://perma.cc/44WR-S6Z4] (“While we
understand that the potential loss of ERISA data is viewed with concern . . . , the Court’s decision
may not be fatal to policy-relevant research.”).
67 Tim Jost, Labor, IRS Propose New Health Plan Reporting Requirements; CMS Makes Its Case on
Cost Sharing (July 12, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/12/labor-irs-propose-new-healthplan-reporting-requirements-cms-makes-its-case-on-cost-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/WLZ8-KWUU];
see also Annual Reporting and Disclosure, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,496, 47,499-47,500 (proposed July 21,
2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2520, 2590) (proposing to expand reporting requirements by
“eliminating obsolete exemptions for certain plans”). In defense of Labor, while they sought
comment on how new data collection requirements related to Gobeille, the data collection was likely
planned before Gobeille, and thus sought only to satisfy Labor’s specific mandate under the
Affordable Care Act for quality improvement efforts of health plans. Id. at 47,528 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185(d) (2012)).
68 Young people tend to be poorer than rich people. But young people who are healthier tend
to be wealthier, and healthier people, holding age constant, tend to be rich. See STEVEN H. WOOLF
ET AL., URBAN INST., & CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH, HOW ARE INCOME AND WEALTH LINKED
TO HEALTH AND LONGEVITY? 1 fig.1 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/
publication-pdfs/2000178-How-are-Income-and-Wealth-Linked-to-Health-and-Longevity.pdf
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available information pot. As of September 2013, pursuant to regulatory
changes, a provider must comply with a patient’s request not to disclose
information to health plans if the patient pays for the service out of pocket.69
Although the law contemplates that patients can prevent doctors from
disclosing data only to health plans, there is reason to think that some
providers could simply omit the data from the health record where possible.
In its overview of the comments to the 2013 rule, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) acknowledged that providers found the new
requirement burdensome as they would “hav[e] to . . . manually redact
information from the medical record” or even “create separate records” prior
to an audit—when an insurer can access most provider files.70 HHS provided
no real guidance to address this concern, suggesting only that providers adopt
data minimization techniques.71 Thus, where providers are not required to
retain information by law or treatment standards, the simplest way to avoid
having to segregate records to guard against inadvertent disclosure and
HIPAA liability is to omit recording information altogether.
But the truly rich do not need the benefit of HIPAA rules. Many of the
richest individuals rely on “concierge medicine.” According to a recent profile,
one such practice has a highly limited number of patients, each of whom pays
$25,000 a year
for unfettered access to the doctors. Patients will be able to call and see and
text the doctors whenever they want; they will be able to receive home visits
. . . . They will be able to ask their doctors to travel to them should they
suspect the onset of illness in June in Umbria.72

[https://perma.cc/S7HB-EAZY] (tracking the likelihood of death and disease relative to economic
standing).
69 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(vi) (2013); see also Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security,
Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other
Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5624 (Jan. 25, 2013) (adopting a final rule
that “restrict[s] certain disclosures of protected health information to a health plan where the
individual pays out of pocket in full for the health care item or service”).
70 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5627.
71 See id. at 5628 (explaining that providers should already “have in place . . . minimum
necessary policies and procedures, which require limiting the protected health information disclosed
to a health plan”).
72 Ginia Bellafante, Enhanced Medical Care for an Annual Fee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/nyregion/enhanced-medical-care-for-an-annual-fee.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/A26Y-HZ72].
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As of 2008, there were twenty-eight concierge doctors in the New York
metropolitan area, and by 2013, there were 124.73 That number may continue
to grow.74
Finally, because nearly all health information comes from providers, those
who do not need to go to providers remain completely insulated from the
collection system. These individuals skew comparatively healthy, wealthy, and
young.75 They can rely on wearable devices like FitBits or, increasingly,
wellness programs, to monitor their health without ever seeing a provider.76
Nonetheless, their data is necessary to develop controls for research involving
illness, including information about normal variation,77 and asymptomatic
versions of certain conditions.78
II. THE BURDENS OF HEALTH INFORMATION COLLECTION
Understanding the need for equity in health information collection
requires appreciating its burdens. Health information collection, storage, and
73 Id.
74 See id. (“The risk of course is that these sort of practices multiply . . . .”).
75 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS:
NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2014 tbl.A-18a (undated), http://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/

Health_Statistics/NCHS/NHIS/SHS/2014_SHS_Table_A-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY7F-MSL8]
[hereinafter CDC STATISTICS]. As the data reveals, younger individuals tend to have less contact
with medical professionals. Id. Holding age constant, individuals with private insurance visit the
doctor less frequently than CMS populations. Id. This is likely—at least in part—due to the fact that
they are healthier. See Paradise & Garfield, supra note 31 (“Medicaid beneficiaries are poorer and have a
poorer health profile compared with both the privately insured and the uninsured.”).
76 See Nick Bilton, Where Wearable Technology Ends Up (Hint: Not Your Wrist), N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/style/where-wearable-technology-ends-up-hint-notyour-wrist.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D42E-W8A4] (describing the wearable fitness tracker
industry as a multi-billion dollar industry, albeit one in decline).
77 See Adeline R. Whitney et al., Individuality and Variation in Gene Expression Patterns in Human
Blood, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 1896, 1900-01 (2003) (using data from healthy individuals
to determine normal variation in gene expression). In fact, a 2012 survey of “6200 doctors, nurses,
lay people, and legislators in Finland found wide disagreement over whether dozens of so-called ‘states
of being’ should even be considered diseases, including ADHD and overactive bladder.” John Fauber et al.,
Lowering the Bar: Medicine in the 21st Century, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 22, 2016), http://www.medpage
today.com/special-reports/LoweringtheBar/58048 [https://perma.cc/6QAH-SQXD].
78 Admittedly data from sicker patients is still thought to be more useful. Thus, records of sick
patients contain more information than those of healthy patients. See Nicole G. Weiskopf et al., Sick
Patients Have More Data: The Non-Random Completeness of Electronic Health Records, 2013 AMIA ANN.
SYMP. PROC. 1472, 1476 (“Sicker patients tend to have more complete records and healthier patients
tend to have records that are less complete.”). But healthy individuals’ information is increasingly
being used for various purposes, including—for example, trying to understand what sickness itself
is. See Hans K. Meier-Ewert et al., Absence of Diurnal Variation of C-Reactive Protein Concentrations
in Healthy Human Subjects, 47 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 426, 426 (2001) (noting that healthy subjects’
data can be used to predict future risk of myocardial infarction and stroke). See generally Carol
Masheter et al., Making Cents of Utah’s Healthy Population, 1 UTAH ATLAS HEALTHCARE, Oct. 2010,
at 1 (explaining Utah’s effort to collect information about healthy individuals).
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use impose burdens—both material and autonomy based—on individuals.79
This Part describes a range of burdens that an individual might suffer by
having her data used. But imposing burdens is not, in itself, normatively
unacceptable—we justify doing so in a range of cases. Thus, this Part is
primarily descriptive in nature.
A. Privacy and Security Harms
Each act of data transmission presents some risk that data will be
breached, even with security precautions in place. The frequency of breaches
has increased.80 In 2015, 113 million electronic health records were breached.81
Almost ninety percent of health care covered entities admitted to a patient
data breach in the last two years.82
Criminal attacks were the leading cause of these breaches, accounting for
about half of them.83 Health care institutions are more vulnerable to these
attacks.84 Hospital “hostage taking” has frequently made the news recently,
where hackers have retained hospital data until they were paid sums of money.85
79 This distinction between material burdens and autonomy-related burdens tracks the
distinction in Calo, supra note 7, at 1133, between objective and subjective burdens.
80 See PONEMON INST., SIXTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PRIVACY & SECURITY OF
HEALTHCARE DATA 1 (2016) (discussing “the increased frequency of [data] breaches” in the health
care industry).
81 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-771, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION: HHS
NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT 9 (2016), http://www.
gao.gov/assets/680/679260.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DCZ-SRAN]; see also id. at 13 (“[T]he magnitude of the
threat against health care information has grown exponentially.”). Another group predicted that one in
three health care recipients would be the victim of a medical data breach in 2016. Dan Munro, Data
Breaches in Healthcare Totaled over 112 Million Records in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2015, 9:11 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112-millionrecords-in-2015/#7c89ac677fd5 [https://perma.cc/2AJN-8SDK].
82 PONEMON INST., supra note 80, at 1.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2. In fact, the health care industry led all industries with eighty-eight percent of all
ransomware detected in the second quarter of 2016. SERT Quarterly Threat Report Q2 2016, NTT
SECURITY (June 26, 2016), https://www.solutionary.com/threat-intelligence/threat-reports/quarterlythreat-reports/sert-threat-report-q2-2016/ [https://perma.cc/95JP-RECR]. And a Brookings
Institution study predicts that one in four data breaches this year will hit the health care industry.
NIAM YARAGHI, BROOKINGS INST., HACKERS, PHISHERS, AND DISAPPEARING THUMB DRIVES:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MAJOR HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES 1 (2016) (“Twenty-three
percent of all data breaches happen in the health care industry.”). The FBI, similarly, anticipates
rising cyber threats to health care. See Joseph Goedert, FBI Sees Rising Cyber Threats to Healthcare,
HEALTH DATA MGMT. (July 13, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/fbisees-rising-cyber-threats-to-healthcare-organizations [https://perma.cc/386V-Y7KJ] (“The Federal
Bureau of Investigation sees increasing presence from hackers trying to access patient information
from providers.”).
85 See e.g., Jeff Stone, Ransomware Hackers a Bigger Threat than Ever, Forcing Hospitals and Police
to Pay Hostage Fees, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
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This has led to discussions among members of the cybersecurity community
and in Congress to increase hospital data security standards.86 Health care
institutions report that they are the least prepared to deal with these breaches
compared to entities in other sectors.87 As the scope and profitability of
secondary research increases, the focus of hackers will likely shift to health data
repositories.88
Further, as one prominent government regulator notes, “[L]egislating
security is really tricky . . . . You write down requirements and the bad guys
immediately supersede them.”89 Many of the breaches or security compromises
involve government entities90 (although there is no evidence that government
entities are, on average, less secure than private entities).
ransomware-hackers-bigger-threat-ever-forcing-hospitals-police-pay-hostage-fees-2319822 [https://
perma.cc/ED5G-NZ9J] (describing a “cyberattack that left a California hospital paralyzed until
administrators agreed to pay a $17,000 ransom”).
86 Id.
87 According to a survey, “An overwhelming majority of health care organizations (69 percent)
and business associates (63 percent) believe they are at greater risk than other industries for a data
breach.” PONEMON INST., supra note 80, at 3. Only 29 percent in health care said they are prepared
to handle external cyber threats, far lower than any other industry. Greg Slabodkin, Healthcare and
Pharma Least Prepared for External Cyber Threats, HEALTH DATA MGMT. (July 18, 2016, 3:33 PM),
https://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/healthcare-and-pharma-least-prepared-for-external-cyberthreats [https://perma.cc/Y4UD-YGV7]. Only a quarter in health care feel they can analyze the threats,
which also lags other industries. Id.
88 See Are EHR Vendors Hackers’ Next Big Target?, HIT CONSULTANT (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://hitconsultant.net/2016/04/11/preparing-ehr-vendors-cyber-threats/ [https://perma.cc/D87K9Q6G] (predicting that electronic health record providers will be increasingly targeted); see also
ERNST & YOUNG, NAVIGATING THE BULL BLACK MARKET 7-9 (2016), https://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-navigating-the-bull-black-market/$FILE/ey-navigating-the-bull-blackmarket.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY3B-XRRW] (noting that pharmaceutical and life sciences firms will
be targeted for clinical trials data).
89 David Pittman, AMA Meeting Under Way in Chicago, POLITICO: MORNING EHEALTH (June
13, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/06/politicos-morningehealth-ama-meeting-under-way-in-chicago-hipaa-confusion-in-orlando-shooting-state-seeks-cloudbased-ehr-214786 [https://perma.cc/788X-B7BP] (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 In a two month period alone, government audits have pointed to “numerous weaknesses” in
the security of Minnesota’s health insurance exchange. AMY J. FRONTZ, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC SUMMARY REPORT:
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CONTROL WEAKNESSES FOUND AT THE MINNESOTA HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGE 2 (2016). In addition, audits have found evidence of weak data encryption,
too many staff members with access to sensitive data, and inconsistent auditing of network activity
in the FDA. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-513, INFORMATION SECURITY: FDA
NEEDS TO RECTIFY CONTROL WEAKNESSES THAT PLACE INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
DATA AT RISK 11-19 (2016). Furthermore, such audits have identified many problems and conflicts
facing federal agencies’ Chief Information Security Officers. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-686, FEDERAL CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICERS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO
IMPROVE ROLES AND ADDRESS CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY 26-31 (2016). One recent hack
involved a contractor of the Milwaukee Veterans Health Affairs Medical Center. See Milwaukee Veterans
Health Information Hacked, WSAW-TV (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:31 PM), http://www.wsaw.com/content/news/
Milwaukee-veterans-health-information-hacked-392226671.html [https://perma.cc/K69W-CWTE]
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Data breaches have led to instances of identity theft, medical and financial
fraud, tainted medical records, and insurance discrimination. Scholars have
also pointed to the risk of employment discrimination that data breaches
pose.91 In another instance from last summer, a hacker put medical records
up for sale on the Internet.92 But, as the Brookings Institution observes,
(describing the hacking of a Wisconsin Medical College employee’s email). I focus here on data
collection and transmission for secondary research by the government. But the few others to
comment on these data policies are troubled by the initial transmission of data to the government.
For example, language in another proposed rule states that a “health care provider is permitted to
disclose protected health information (PHI) (without patient authorization and without a business
associate agreement)” to a government entity so that it can “perform the required on-site
surveillance of the certified EHR technology.” Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment
System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment Model (APM) Incentive Under the Physician Fee
Schedule, and Criteria for Physician-Focused Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,162, 28,171 (proposed
May 9, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.Rs. pts. 414, 495). One prominent commentator from the
Brookings Institution argues that such surveillance “is extremely dangerous and inefficient.” Yaraghi,
supra note 47. I agree that such surveillance is unnecessary in this case, but in the case of secondary
research, data collection is necessary. But those burdens should be imposed in a fair manner.
91 Health data breaches often involve names and social security numbers, such as in a recent
breach involving Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) data. See Jessica Bartlett, MGH Says
Patients Impacted by Third-Party Data Breach, BOS. BUS. J. (June 29, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://
www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/health-care/2016/06/mgh-says-patients-impacted-by-third-partydata.html [https://perma.cc/MZ36-9AG9] (describing a 2016 hack of MGH’s software provider,
which exposed patient names, birthdays, social security numbers, and medical research). This results
in identity theft and financial and medical fraud. See Jessica Davis, Ransomware and Tax Fraud Rise
as Healthcare Hit with More Data Breaches than Any Other Industry, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (April
13, 2016, 7:58 AM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ransomware-and-tax-fraud-rise-healthcarehit-more-data-breaches-any-other-industry [https://perma.cc/GD2N-QL4A] (cataloguing the rise of tax
fraud and the issues faced by victims); IBM: 70% of Businesses Paid Cybercriminals to Unlock Ransomware,
HIPAA J. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.hipaajournal.com/phi-theft-by-employees-peacehealth-8210/i
[https://perma.cc/CD5N-U5TV] (describing instances of medical record theft). This may also
muddy medical histories. See Darius Tahir & Bob Herman, Data Breaches Can Lead to Major Medical
Identity Theft Issues, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20150304/NEWS/150309960 [https://perma.cc/TB6K-YCVG] (noting that healthcare data breaches
can result in a “completely altered medical history” for patients). Health records can be used for
other medical purposes, such as creating fake opioid prescriptions. See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Why
Hackers Want Your Health Care Data Most of All, INFOWORLD TECH WATCH (Sep. 14, 2015),
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2983634/security/why-hackers-want-your-health-care-databreaches-most-of-all.html [https://perma.cc/W5AL-9WFP] (“Stolen health care data forums
operate more like drug cartels, where health records are not sold outright, but rather used to buy
and sell addictive prescriptions.”); see also Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance
of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 98 (2014) (identifying insurance fraud as
an example of how patient identify records can be misused).
92 Dissent Doe, 655,000 Patient Records For Sale on the Dark Net After Hacking Victims Refuse
Extortion Demands, DAILY DOT (June 27, 2016, 7:29 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/655000patient-records-dark-net/ [https://perma.cc/C7H3-3S9Y]. The hacker offered to sell the personal
information of 655,000 patients whose data were stolen from three databases that refused to pay a
ransom. Id. Specifically, 48,000 records from a Farmington, Missouri database were offered for
$100,000; 397,000 records from an Atlanta database were offered for $400,000; and 210,000 records
from a Central/Midwest database were offered for $200,000. Id. The data include names, addresses,
Social Security numbers, birthdates, emails, gender, and phone numbers. Id.
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“Despite the public concerns over health care privacy breaches, we do not
know exactly why hackers are interested in stealing medical data or how
exactly they monetize it.”93 For example, hackers may hold on to breached
records for years before using them to commit medical or financial identity
theft or blackmail.94
Although there is “a great deal of confusion about the value of stolen
medical data in the black market,”95 we know that criminal elements value
health data. Experts uniformly report that health data is more valuable than
other data, and that its value is on the rise.96 And information professionals,
even those that support secondary research, are increasingly worried about
data breaches.
Breaches affect private and public institutions alike. But because of the
new policies described in Part I, the poorer and older bear greater risk. Data
risk increases as the range of uses, the number of entities with access, and the
amount and kind of data used increases. Human error is often the most
important security hurdle as individuals misplace storage devices or transmit
data over unsecured connections or to incorrect recipients.97 Using identifiers—
especially names and social security numbers—also increases risk.98

93 Niam Yaraghi, To Mitigate Medical Hacks, Identify Incentives for Hackers, BROOKINGS (Aug. 16,
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/08/16/to-mitigate-medical-hacks-identify-incentivesfor-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/4EHN-MHXQ].
94 One IBM Security executive learned that the medical records of his two grade-school-age
children were compromised in a health care data breach months after it happened. According to the
Boston Globe, “Those identities are essentially worthless for a criminal seeking quick payoff—
nobody’s going to give a loan to a preteen. But once those kids reach their 18th birthdays . . . , the
leak could come back to haunt their finances. ‘How long is it going to be before that 18-year-old
realizes that somebody at another address has established credit in their name?’” Curt Woodward, Health
Files Make for a Juicy Target for Thieves, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2016/08/07/hackers-turn-health-care-where-records-fetch-bigger-bucks/OSi8imOSGPstvwV6DyYhoJ/
story.html?s_campaign=bostonglobe:socialflow:twitter [https://perma.cc/25QZ-K9YY].
95 Yaraghi, supra note 93.
96 See Goedert, supra note 84 (“Recent events suggest that the pressure [from hackers trying
to access patient information] may be rising . . . .”).
97 See Jeff Goldman, December Data Breach Roundup: Theft Prevention, and More, ESECURITY
PLANET (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/december-data-breachroundup-theft-prevention-and-more.html [https://perma.cc/6XRY-DTGM] (advocating for employer
education as a prevention tool for data breaches).
98 Privacy advocates are even worried about the possibility of re-identification of de-identified
data. In a high-profile example of this risk, the former Chief Technology Officer of the Federal Trade
Commission, Latanya Sweeney, purchased de-identified insurance records from a state insurance
database when she was a graduate student, and she was able to identify those of then–Massachusetts
Governor William Weld by combining them with other public data. Daniel Barth-Jones, The Debate
Over ‘Re-Identification’ of Health Information: What Do We Risk?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/08/10/the-debate-over-re-identification-of-health-informati
on-what-do-we-risk/ [https://perma.cc/6RAK-NQ4Y].
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The data of those in CMS programs has experienced a marked increase
in transmission and accumulation—often in identified formats—for multiple
uses.99 The data of those in private programs is transmitted and used less, and
never transmitted externally in identified formats. Those who self-pay may
never have their data recorded, much less used.
B. Personhood Harms
Studies suggest that individuals are concerned with harms that go beyond
material threats from malicious actors. In many circumstances, individuals
object to the collection or use of information without consent, even if there
is no threat—including when the data is used only for research. This concern
is echoed in recent practices. Within the last two years alone, the federal
government retained, but then ultimately decided not to implement, a proposal
to require informed consent for research involving biospecimen data,100 and the
British National Health Service has come under fire for a project involving
the transmission of anonymous data to Google for research.101
The story of Henrietta Lacks presents a good example of the kind of harm
to which I am alluding. Lacks was an African-American woman who received
indigent medical care in the 1950s. In the process, her cells with unique
properties were harvested without her permission. When this was recently
99 Moreover, CMS in particular is not fully compliant with breach notification requirements
and does not offer remedies to Medicare patients when there are breaches. See Investigation Faults
Handling of Medicare Patient Data Breaches, AMEDNEWS.COM (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.amednews.
com/article/20121029/business/310299965/6/ [https://perma.cc/ADB8-FRZQ] (noting that the Office of
the Inspector General “found that Medicare wasn’t doing enough to mitigate damages caused when
a Medicare patient’s identification is stolen”).
100 The government first proposed this requirement in its Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for the Common Rule in 2011, and it retained the requirement in its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. In explaining why it proposed to retain the consent requirement, the government
observed, “[T]here is a growing recognition that many people want to have some degree of control
over the circumstances in which an investigator can derive information about them, above and apart
from their interest in whether or not that information might be inappropriately disclosed. More
specifically, a growing body of literature shows that in general people prefer to have the opportunity
to consent (or refuse to consent) to research involving their own biological materials . . . . [I]t is not
consistent with the majority of the public’s wishes, which reflect legitimate autonomy interests.”
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,942, 53,944 (proposed
Sept. 8, 2015). Notably, the proposed rulemaking cites an infamous incident involving the use of
Havasupai genes for research without consent. Id. at 53,943 n.43 (citing National Congress of
American Indians, Havasupai Tribe and the Lawsuit Settlement Aftermath, NAT’L CONGRESS AM.
INDIANS, http://genetics.ncai.org/case-study/havasupai-Tribe.cfm [https://perma.cc/42Z9-AXEX]).
However, after receiving significant pressure from industry and other groups, the government
decided not to impose this requirement. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82
Fed. Reg. 7149, 7165 (Jan. 19, 2017).
101 See Why Google DeepMind Wants Your Medical Records, BBC (July 19, 2016), http://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-36783521 [https://perma.cc/FM7U-4VYV] (describing the criticism that
followed the announcement that Google was given access to the health care data of 1.6 million patients).
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discovered, the settlement that Lacks’s descendants reached did not prohibit
the use of their genetic data. Rather, they received some control over who
accesses the data and credit for publications involving the data.102
The Lacks story is simply an early instance of the growing “biorights”
movement. Last May, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit
on behalf of four plaintiffs against Myriad Genetics,103 a company notorious
for trying to (unsuccessfully) patent genes predicting breast cancer.104 Myriad
obtains genetic samples from patients and lets them know if they are at risk
for certain conditions, but does not provide them access to the coded data.
The suit asks the Department of Health and Human Services “to ensure
patients have access to all the genetic data a testing company gleans from their
samples, not simply whether they have a certain gene or condition.”105 In this
case, the plaintiffs want to make the data available for public research.106
Studies show that when it comes to data use, consent is key—individuals
believe that using data without consent is wrong but are happy to provide
consent if asked.107 Their focus appears to be on the dignitary affront and
102 Malcolm Ritter, NIH, Family of Henrietta Lacks Reach Deal on Access to DNA Code, WASH.
POST (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/nih-family-of-henriettalacks-reach-deal-on-access-to-dna-code/2013/08/07/68f3da04-ff8b-11e2-96a8-d3b921c0924a_
story.html [https://perma.cc/3U58-UHKU].
103 Beth Daley & Ellen Cranley, ‘Biorights’ Rise: Donors Demand Control of Their Samples, BOS.
GLOBE (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/10/09/the-rise-biorights-donorsare-demanding-control-and-sometimes-cash-exchange-for-geneticsamples/jCbaQ2E5t6c0Qs1kcITMRM/
story.html [https://perma.cc/GN2A-C6RA].
104 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Myriad Genetics Ending Patent Dispute on Breast Cancer Risk Testing,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/business/myriad-genetics-endingpatent-dispute-on-breast-cancer-risk-testing.html [https://perma.cc/M9MT-68VX] (“Myriad
Genetics has essentially given up trying to stop other companies from offering tests for
increased risk of breast cancer . . . .”).
105 Daley & Cranley, supra note 103. Admittedly, individuals are happy to provide their data in
return for payment. DNAsimple, for example, pays for data. Id. But while whether companies should
be allowed to pay for this data is an open question, it cannot be denied that payment at least gives
individuals a sense of control. Patients “feel part of the process when they get compensated.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward
a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 746 (2004) (“Genetic
information is seen as a commodity, disaggregated from the self, rather than something in which we
have a dignitary and personhood interest.”).
106 Other examples exist. For example, Medtronic refuses requests for patients’ own heart data.
See Jonah Comstock, Medtronic Launches Connected App for Pacemaker Patients, but Patients Can’t See
the Data, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/48596/medtroniclaunches-connected-app-for-pacemaker-patients-but-patients-cant-see-the-data [https://perma.cc/
V4M3-4QKA] (describing a Medtronic mobile app that permits patients to forward pacemaker data
to providers but that does not provide patients with actual access to the data). Indeed, “early players
in the game have sequestered information in ‘closed loop’ systems.” John T. Wilbanks & Eric J.
Topol, Stop the Privatization of Health Data, NATURE (July 29, 2016), http://www.nature.com/
news/stop-the-privatization-of-health-data-1.20268 [https://perma.cc/PV77-ZDDP].
107 See Daley & Cranley, supra note 103 (“About 68% of people are willing to give permission
for researchers to use their specimens to be used for any purpose . . . . But support drop[s] to 55%
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sense of violation that comes from sharing data without consent—rather than
privacy or security harms.108
This Article does not seek to identify the precise dignity interest at stake.
Rather, I rely on a rough analogy to another kind of dignitary or personhood
harm that has appeared in the property literature. Many years ago, Margaret
Radin argued that an individual’s property is imbued with their personhood.109
Property enables the creation and execution of future projects, and populates
memory with projects past. It helps us conceptualize the individual as a
continuous entity through time.110 This creates an empirically demonstrated
psychological link between individuals and their property.111
Similarly, rights to the information about one’s body, mind, and certain
objects grant a person autonomy to choose his or her course in life. In
discussing the learning health system, President Obama explained that it
helps “empower[] individuals” to monitor and take a more active role in their
own health.”112 Health data can be used to develop essential life goals related
if patients kn[o]w their sample will be used to ‘develop patents and earn profits for commercial
companies.’”). And a National Institutes of Health (NIH) survey shows that if asked, a majority of
Americans (fifty-four percent) said they would “definitely or probably participate” in the NIH’s
Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program, which requires personal data such as blood samples,
genetic information, family medical history, soil and water samples from their home, as well as data
on their lifestyle, diet, and exercise. Survey Shows Broad Support for National Precision Medicine Study
(Aug. 17, 2016), NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/
survey-shows-broad-support-national-precision-medicine-study [https://perma.cc/4BHU-EHP7].
Among younger people, college-educated people, and those who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
or transgender, interest in participation was even higher. Id.
108 One study found that 77% of individuals would feel “violated and [that their] trust in the
researchers [would be] betrayed” in such a situation. ALAN F. WESTIN, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS
PRIVACY AND HEALTH RESEARCH 25 (rev. 2008). But only 44% percent feared employment
discrimination, and just 33% feared embarrassment “before friends, associates or the public.” Id.
Indeed, only 19% of individuals were willing to have their information used without their consent
when their anonymity was assured. Id. at 28. Similarly, Westin reviewed previous studies that
showed a consistent majority who argued that data can only be used with consent. Id. at 45-46; see
also WESTAT, AHRQ PUB. NO. 09-0081-EF, FINAL REPORT: CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT IN
DEVELOPING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2 (2009) (“A substantial proportion [of
focus group participants] felt that health care consumers owned their data and needed a role in ensuring
that those data were secure and used only in ways that they authorized.”); Evette J. Ludman et al., Glad
You Asked: Participants’ Opinions of Re-Consent to dbGAP Data Submission, 5 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON
HUM. RES. ETHICS, Sept. 2010, at 9, 13 (“It was very important or somewhat important to the
majority . . . of respondents that they were asked for their permission to add their health and genetic
information to the databank.”).
109 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982).
110 See Craig J. Konnoth, Revoking Rights, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1378 (2015) (explaining
Radin’s theory that “property is what permits an individual to project herself into the future or the
past [and] . . . populate one’s memory with substance”).
111 See Radin, supra note 109 (noting that property rights provide the control needed to achieve
proper self-development).
112 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Precision Medicine Panel
Discussion (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/remarks-president-
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to individual fitness, health, work, and recreation. For example, data about
ovulation and other reproductive information (now often generated through
apps) can assist with planning one’s family.113 Information is therefore used
to develop a range of life choices in contexts of both work and play. President
Obama himself supports an autonomy-based ownership understanding of
information: “[O]nce you understand [that the data is] yours, . . . you have
agency in the process.”114
But apart from autonomy, information about an individual’s bodily
characteristics, whether or not it is attached to a specific identifier, has deeper
ontological significance.115 It helps us conceptualize the person as a person.
Information regarding one’s DNA helps establish one’s connection to one’s family,
perhaps even to one’s ethnic or social group. Key demographic characteristics such
as race and gender are constructed in part by—and understood through—medical
frames.116 Other health-relevant information, such as sexual behavior and
orientation, perform similar functions.117
Further, the “quantified-self ” movement promotes data streams as the
best form of self-conceptualization and knowledge.118 This movement promotes
the use of devices that not only “solve problems related to health,” but also
produce data about steps walked, heartbeat, calories (consumed and burned),

precision-medicine-panel-discussion [https://perma.cc/VY3B-CS95] [hereinafter President Obama,
Precision Medicine Panel Remarks].
113 See Melissa Willets, The 10 Best Fertility Apps, FITPREGNANCY.COM, http://www.fit
pregnancy.com/pregnancy/getting-pregnant/best-fertility-apps [https://perma.cc/GKQ8-ARAP]
(exploring how various apps can help individuals with family planning).
114 Darius Tahir, President Talks eHealth, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.
politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/10/president-talks-ehealth-fda-guidance-announcement-today216870#ixzz4Nw5sihqe [https://perma.cc/Z7PP-J2F8].
115 Irma van der Ploeg, The Body as Data in the Age of Information, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 176, 181 (Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty & David Lyon eds., 2012).
116 See generally Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Race and Biology, in THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RACE (Linda Alcoff et al. eds., forthcoming 2017),
https://philpapers.org/archive/WINRAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9D6-MZSR].
117 In a touching story on a prominent blog, one medical professional writes as follows: “Seven
years ago, I lost a college-aged patient in a car accident. Placing the final dictation in her chart a
week later gave me the opportunity to reflect on our relationship and her assorted illnesses, injuries,
and well visits over almost two decades. What a treasure to behold after years of friendship and
medical care. Her paper chart was tangible proof of a life well-lived. I recently contacted her mother
to inquire if she wanted her daughter’s medical chart. She said it was a gift to see her daughter
through the eyes of her physician, who was there every step of the way. Medical records are more
than metadata on a computer screen; they are a sacred chronicle of our enduring connection with
our patients in life, and even in death.” Niran Al-Agba, My Ideal EHR, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Aug. 23,
2016), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2016/08/23/my-ideal-ehr/ [https://perma.cc/Y83T-WMYE].
118 As anthropologist Dana Greenfield explains, quantified self is a “utopian project[], where,
. . . health behaviors can be changed . . . and self-knowledge, -awareness, and -mindfulness can be
achieved.” Dana Greenfield, Deep Data: Notes on the n of 1, in QUANTIFIED: BIOSENSING
TECHNOLOGIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE 123, (Dawn Nafus ed., 2016).
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brainwaves, and breathing—to name a few—as a way of knowing oneself.119
Indeed, genetic data is popularly framed as the essence of personhood.120
Thus, one surveillance scholar asks, “[W]here exactly is the transition from
bodily matter to bodily data? Does it really still make sense to try to make
the distinction?”121 Modern data collection in the form of DNA codes or
biomarkers marks a time of transition such that data is not just “representations
of the body” but rather “a change on the level of ontology.”122
To be sure, as Radin noted of property, not all information will have the
same level of import to everyone in all contexts. Property can range from
items that are deeply constitutive of personhood to “fungible” items like money
that are held merely for instrumental reasons.123 Similarly, data can range from
information which embeds and constructs important self-conceptualization to
facts that hold little meaning. For example, to an HIV-positive person, a low
white cell blood count can have a major impact; to others, it may not. Depending
on context, such information can lie on a spectrum.
But pulled together, even trivial data can create a mosaic picture of the
individual in which she has deep personhood interests.124 Genetic data can
help recreate facial structure.125 Various health data brought together could
predict various personality traits or moods like irritability, depression,
generosity, and stress.
Finally, data determines how an individual is seen by others. As Louis
Althusser’s famous theory of interpellation explains, a person is constituted,
in part, through the characteristics that society and its members attribute to
119 Kashmir Hill, Adventures in Self-Surveillance, Aka the Quantified Self, Aka Extreme NavelGazing, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/04/07/
adventures-in-self-surveillance-aka-the-quantified-self-aka-extreme-navel-gazing/#1916f7bf7b12
[https://perma.cc/45E3-C465]; see also Counting Every Moment, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21548493 [https://perma.cc/QU5G-7Q79] (exploring the concept
of self-tracking and the “belief that gathering and analyzing data about [one’s] everyday activities
can help . . . improve [one’s] li[fe]”).
120 For example, 23andMe’s test kit reads “Welcome to You,” and an informational webpage is
entitled “23 pairs of chromosomes. One unique you.” 23 Pairs of Chromosome, One Unique You,
23ANDMEBLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), http://blog.23andme.com/23andme-and-you/23andme-how-to/23pairs-of-chromosomes-one-unique-you/ [https://perma.cc/Y9Q2-HA2K].
121 van der Ploeg, supra note 115, at 180.
122 Id. at 178-79.
123 See Radin, supra note 109, at 960, 966 (describing how some property is fungible to
everyone, like money, while some property is fungible to certain individuals, like a car to a dealer or
hair to a wigmaker).
124 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320
(2012) (suggesting that “five justices are ready to embrace the . . . mosaic approach”).
125 See Sara Reardon, Mugshots Built from DNA Data: Computer Program Crudely Predicts a Facial
Structure from Genetic Variations, NATURE (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nature.com/news/mugshotsbuilt-from-dna-data-1.14899 [https://perma.cc/9DKF-RFGF] (describing a new “computer program
that can create a . . . 3D model of a face from a DNA sample”).
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her.126 The collection and analysis of the data categorizes the individual based
on her genes, medication, addictions, and disease history as low or high risk,
normal or abnormal, healthy or unhealthy. An individual may well feel
discomfort at being characterized as abnormal by some faraway anonymous
researcher even if that label cannot be ultimately attributed to her.
Even if the data is not used to recategorize the individual per se, individuals
may object to what is done with their information. Because they retain a bond
with their information, they may feel responsible when their information is
used for research into procedures that they find offensive such as abortion or
blood transfusions.127 In a recent qualitative study, individuals also objected
to research into “intelligence and race,” which they felt can be used perpetuate
past discrimination128 and expressed concern that their data may be used by
“law enforcement in . . . fishing schemes.”129
Thus, what may be at stake for many individuals is an aspect of their
personhood. Even if the results of the research cannot be connected back to
a particular patient, her sense of dignity as an autonomous individual is at
stake.130 Therefore, individuals feel they have a claim to their information, whether
it is identified or de-identified. As the Agency for Healthcare Research Quality
notes, a majority of individuals use the metaphor of ownership to describe their
relationship with the data, and a majority object to even de-identified use of
the data without consent.131
C. Expressive Harms
Data collection activity can cause what I call “expressive harms.” The way
in which society distributes its resources and treats individuals’ personhood
126 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production, in LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 121, 161 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971).
127 See Amy R. Applebaum, Note, When Parental Autonomy Clashes with a Child’s Interest in the
Advances of Science: The Case for the Future of Court-Ordered Gene Therapy, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1543,
1547-48 (2002) (“Many cases involving court-ordered medical treatments of minors have involved
the objections of Jehovah’s Witnesses to blood transfusions based on their religion’s mandate
forbidding such procedures . . . .”).
128 Catherine M. Hammack, The Petrie–Flom Ctr. for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and
Bioethics, 2016 Annual Conference: Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics: Thought Leader
Perspectives on Risks and Protections in Precision Medicine Research (June 16, 2016), https://www.
slideshare.net/petrieflom/catherine-m-hammack-thought-leader-perspectives-on-risks-and-protectionsin-precision-medicine-research [https://perma.cc/RQ86-QLWX].
129 Id.
130 Even if information is never improperly released and never results in any concrete harms,
information collection is inherently a status-creating activity. Konnoth, supra note 7, at 64. As the
Supreme Court has recognized several times, information collection has an expressive aspect; it can
humiliate or “send a message.” Id. at 17, 20, 23.
131 See WESTAT, supra note 108, at 6 (explaining that surveys suggest health care consumers
want to “decide what goes into and who can access their medical records”).
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symbolically demonstrates respect or disrespect towards them. Welfare
recipients are constantly surveilled: social workers intrude into their homes
to supervise their family and child-rearing behavior, their food consumption
is monitored, and they are subject to random drug tests.132 Racial minorities
are subject to searches in schools and on the streets, and certain reproductive
choices that poor women make are subject to surveillance.133
Placing these individuals under greater degrees of scrutiny than other
members of society marks them as less deserving of privacy, and as having less
of a right to determine when and how information about them should be
released. Those who can control information access, by contrast, are imbued
with social status. Subjecting only certain groups of individuals in society to
information burdens and exempting others reinforces existing hierarchies in
society.134
In particular, through the programs I describe, individuals on Medicare
and Medicaid are situated within a framework where they are regularly
subjected to informational risk and indignity.135 By marking low-income
individuals in this way, health information surveillance further “otherizes”
them from mainstream society and citizenship.
But the kind of surveillance that occurs here imposes a new kind of
exploitative indignity. Health information is a resource in which individuals have
intimate personhood interests, whether the data is identified or de-identified.
Moreover, maintaining the material wellbeing necessary for autonomy—
employment, health insurance, and engagement with the medical system—also
requires informational integrity. Disproportionately sacrificing a group’s
privacy, information security, and dignity for the benefit of the population as
132 See Bryce Covert, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients Is a Popular New Policy that Costs States
Million. Here Are the Results, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 19, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/drugtesting-welfare-recipients-is-a-popular-new-policy-that-cost-states-millions-here-are-the-cf82925
7ade0#.jp2rkxrfn [https://perma.cc/262V-A79Z] (“At least 13 state legislatures have enacted laws to
drug test TANF applicants or beneficiaries.”).
133 See Konnoth, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that “parents may be informed about the
reproductive decisions of their minor children within their custody”).
134 See id. at 37 (“[I]ntrusions and surveillance are inherently confrontational and hierarchizing.”).
135 Intriguingly, a 1990 letter to the New York Times suggests that privacy may be a luxury only
the wealthy can afford. See Hollis Robbins, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Let Privacy Be a Luxury for the
Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/04/opinion/l-don-t-letprivacy-be-a-luxury-for-the-wealthy-927590.html [https://perma.cc/L3KJ-GY8Q] (describing the
prohibitive cost of maintaining a caller ID block); see also Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of A “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1038 (2014)
(describing searches in economically distressed and historically disadvantaged communities);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right
of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (1991) (noting that government intrusion into the lives of
pregnant women is particularly harsh for poor women of color); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 392, 406 (2003) (arguing that poor people
are afforded fewer privacy and autonomy protections than the wealthy).
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a whole, rather than using it only in service of group wellbeing, constitutes a
kind of exploitation of one part of the population for the rest. This harms
dignity interests—not just because of how data is collected, but because of how
it is used.
This renders the health information collection system different from
other kinds of information programs. Welfare, penal, and reproductive
surveillance is based on paternalism or stereotyping and grounded in
perceptions of difference—of danger, dishonesty, or immaturity.136 But the
health information collection system is, ironically, based on a perception of
biological sameness. Rendering CMS data the basis for population-based
medical research makes sense only if one believes that beneficiaries’ data is
on some level similar to that of the rest of the population. This sameness
becomes the ground for a kind of exploitation that exempts those who can
afford private insurance from the obligations of information collection, while
still allowing them access to the benefits. The poor and elderly become
proxies in a conscription scheme for the greater good.
This harm is best conceptualized by Julie Cohen’s work on the
commodification of individuals as data.137 Cohen argues that commercial big
data ventures seek to “extract . . . marketplace value” from consumers, who
are treated as “a repository of raw materials that are there for the taking and
that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive activity.”138 The
function of these technologies is anti-individualistic: it is “to subsume
individual variation and idiosyncrasy within a probabilistic gradient. Their
purpose is to make human behaviors and preferences calculable [and]
predictable . . . in aggregate . . . . [P]artial (or even complete) misalignments
at the individual level are irrelevant.”139
Cohen focuses on the consumer marketplace, but many of her insights can
be extended to medical research as well. Despite how laudable the result may
be, harvesting medical data shifts its role. Where medical research was once
individuated—the means for diagnosis, treatment, and cure of the individual—it
becomes alienated and harnessed for the purposes of others. Cohen relies on the
famous case Moore v. Regents of the University of California, where a patient
sued to assert a right to the products made from his cells.140 Such processes
136
137

Konnoth, supra note 7, at 51.
My solution, of course, only addresses inequality related problems. The broader issues that
Cohen identifies may suggest limiting the system altogether. As I note in the Introduction, I am not
averse to this outcome—as long as whatever outcome is achieved is done so in a way that is equitable.
138 Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain 2 (Sept. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2666570.
139 Id. at 19.
140 See id. at 24 (discussing Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990), which held that patients do not have a right to share in the profits earned from the
research of their cells). Cohen also identifies the harnessing of subordinated populations’ (such as
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“naturalize[] practices of appropriation” as applied to specific groups such as
those on welfare.141
This kind of exploitation undermines autonomy by creating a relationship
of domination over poorer and older individuals. Iris Marion Young identifies
exploitation as the first of oppression’s faces: exploitation “occurs through a
steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to
benefit another.”142 Here, it is not the labor of individuals that is being
sacrificed, but rather, their privacy, information, medical security, and even
their dignity. Rather than deploying resources for their own flourishing and
according to their own perceptions of what is good, the poor and elderly are
being asked to sacrifice for others.
D. Medical Harms
Finally, for those who remain unmoved by the dignitary harms visited
upon individuals because of what they may characterize as uneducated
attitudes toward data, these issues raise practical consequences as well.
Surveys show that many individuals avoid receiving medical care rather than
being subject to health collection mandates. For example, the California
Health Care Foundation found that 13-17% of consumers attempt to hide
information to protect their privacy.143
The avoidance varies by medical condition, and such behavior is usually
most prevalent in the early stages of the onset of a condition. Thus, HHS
estimated that based on privacy concerns, 586,000 Americans did not seek
earlier cancer treatment and that roughly 2,000,000 Americans did not seek
treatment for mental illness.144 Likewise, HHS noted that “there [was] great
welfare recipients) data more generally than discussed here. See Cohen, supra note 138, at 11 (“The
push to exploit the biopolitical public domain is a contest over a postcolonial terrain, in which global
networked elites seek to harness the power of populations worldwide.”).
141 Id. at 25.
142 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 49 (2011 ed. 2011).
Bioethics scholarship is of course replete with discussion and definition of exploitation. See, e.g.,
Ruth Macklin, Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection, 17 BIOETHICS 472, 475 (2003) (discussing the
exploitation of vulnerable populations in medical research). But Young better explains the structural
kind of exploitation with which I am concerned. An individual’s sense of self, personhood, identity,
and capacity to function is, to various degrees, formed, supported, and maintained using social
resources, institutions, community norms, symbols, hermeneutics, habits, and tradition. See Simon
Caney, Liberalism and Communitarianism: A Misconceived Debate, 40 POL. STUD. 273, 276-79 (1992)
(explaining the “embeddedness thesis,” which states that “it is a sociological fact that a person’s
character is shaped . . . by cultural context”).
143 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., NATIONAL CONSUMER HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 2005 4
(2005), http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20C/PDF%20
consumerprivacy2005execsum.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FYS-ARVC].
144 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,
82,777-79 (Dec. 28, 2000).
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uncertainty” as to the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases “due to
under-reporting.” 145
These programs, which render the data of the poor and elderly more easily
available for secondary research, are in their early stages. To my knowledge,
their existence has passed under the radar. But as further research makes the
disparate use of this data apparent, along with the concomitant dignity, privacy,
and security harms, it might well increase distrust in the public medical system.
A single data breach of CMS data would be even more devastating.
The effects could last generations among poor and elderly populations.
We see analogs elsewhere—the dignitary and material harms faced by racial
minorities in the United States, for example, has led to dramatic mistrust of
law enforcement. In the medical context, the closest analog might be the
Tuskegee Study, which left syphilis untreated in 600 African-American
men.146 For forty years, the men were kept from many forms of treatment for
the sake of research without knowing the study existed.147 Many researchers
believe that that study continues to bear significant responsibility for
mistrustful attitudes toward medical care and research participation, and for
the resultant negative medical outcomes, among African Americans.148
Although the physical harms it imposes are lesser, the differential treatment
of their data can similarly harm the relationship of the poor and elderly with
the medical system by decreasing trust.
*

*

*

The poor and elderly are uniquely vulnerable to the harms I have listed.
Financial or medical identity theft can wipe out one’s life savings or lead to
delays in receiving medical services. While financial identity theft might take
greater amounts of money from wealthier individuals in absolute terms, lowincome, less-educated, and elderly individuals are less likely to be able to
recover from medical or financial identity theft, go without medical care, or
pay for medical care out of pocket.149

145
146

Id. at 82,778.
Susan M. Reverby, Introduction: More than a Metaphor: An Overview of the Scholarship of the
Study, in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 1, 1 (Susan M.
Reverby ed., 2000).
147 Id.
148 See generally id.
149 See Jessica Coombs, Note, Scamming the Elderly: An Increased Susceptibility to Financial
Exploitation Within and Outside of the Family, ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 243, 252-53 (2014) (“When the
younger generation [suffer financial losses,] they have more of an opportunity to recover, whereas
the elderly might never get back on their feet after what has the potential to be such a tremendous loss.”).
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Similarly, status and dignity harms may be uniquely difficult for lowincome and elderly individuals.150 Both groups may have status concerns
because they may see themselves as dependent. Both groups are subject to
relatively greater surveillance and supervision.151 Harnessing their data for
the rest of society, rather than for their own good, can therefore be
particularly harmful to their dignity.
III. ARGUING FOR EQUITY
So far, I have identified how laws and regulation have facilitated
informational inequities. Principles of bioethics help explain the problems
with these inequities.152 This, in turn, has policy ramifications, as research
regulations largely look to principles of bioethics for guidance. Thus, agencies
from HHS to the Department of Defense, the Department of Education, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the FDA rely on bioethical principles
to set research policy in their respective areas.153
150 While some studies consider privacy preferences based on age, these studies cannot control
for the fact that younger individuals have yet to experience various adult situations in which privacy
is more important. As ACLU lawyer Jay Stanley notes, a teen or young adult may, when asked about
the importance of privacy, only think about the question in a world where the intruders are parents,
teachers, or other trusted observers. They do not consider employment or insurance discrimination,
law enforcement, or other entities. Jay Stanley, Do Young People Care About Privacy?, ACLU (Apr.
29, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/do-young-people-care-about-privacy?redirect=blog/
technology-and-liberty/do-young-people-care-about-privacy [https://perma.cc/YQ7N-G6HW]. In
any case, these studies show that older individuals value privacy more than younger individuals. One
might therefore conclude that at least for now, intrusions on the elderly are experienced as more
burdensome. To my knowledge, no robust studies have examined privacy preferences based on income.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 31–54; see also ELDER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1826 (Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison McChrystal Barnes eds., 5th ed. 2011) (explaining how the elderly
are reliant on the support of others); id. at 355-407 (discussing guardianship); id. at 409-33
(discussing power of attorney); id. at 447-502 (discussing health care surrogate decisionmaking); id.
at 503-69 (discussing the vulnerability and supervision of elderly with respect to domestic and
institutional caregivers). Of course, not all elderly individuals suffer from a loss of privacy, but more
elderly individuals are vulnerable in this way than the general population.
152 No positive legal provision is doctrinally violated by this problem of inequity. Indeed, the
federal statutes discussed in Part I pave the way for these inequities.
153 See, e.g., Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6CJ8X9GS] (“The current U.S. system of protection for human research subjects is heavily influenced
by . . . basic ethical principles . . . .”); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects,
80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,940, 53,942 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing the influence of bioethicists
in current initiatives and highlighting the “ethical importance of obtaining consent for genomics
research”); Response to Comments Received for “The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles Guiding
Information and Communication Technology Research” (“The Menlo Report”) for the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology, Cyber Security Division (CSD), Protected
Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure Against Cyber Threats (PREDICT) Project, 77 Fed.
Reg. 73,669, 73,670 (Dec. 11, 2012) (stating that the Menlo Report, which sets forth ethical guidelines
for information security research, is “founded on the Belmont Model, which was originally
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Much of this policy is guided by the Belmont Report for the Protection
of Human Subjects.154 The 1979 Report, prepared by the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
has laid out the essential principles of biomedical research for the last four
decades. It was prompted in part by the research atrocities perpetrated during
World War II and the Tuskegee Study.155
The Report identifies three principles as fundamental: “respect for
persons,” “beneficence,” and “justice.”156 The principle of respect demands
consideration of an individual’s “autonomous” choice.157 Beneficence requires
“secur[ing] the[] well-being” of individuals.158 Justice considers “fairness in
distribution.”159 Each of these principles is underdefined in the abstract and
takes on a shape in particular contexts. The equity problem with secondary
research primarily implicates questions of justice.
A generation ago, the Report anticipated some of the issues with which I
engage. The Commission observed that in previous “centuries[,] the burdens
of serving as research subjects fell largely upon poor ward patients, while the
benefits of improved medical care flowed primarily to private patients.”160 It
therefore cautioned that “the selection of research subjects needs to be
scrutinized in order to determine whether some classes (e.g., welfare patients . . .)
are being systematically selected simply because of their easy availability, [or]
their compromised position.”161
For various reasons, however, burden–equity considerations have not
traveled into modern health information ethics. First, as a Belmont Report
coauthor Albert Jonsen notes, “Justice was the neglected sibling among the
principles of bioethics, always acknowledged but seldom given significant
tasks or much praise.”162 In the health information context in particular, the
ethical focus is almost exclusively on autonomy concerns, namely, on the

developed for the biomedical research context”); Protections for Subjects in Human Research, 71
Fed. Reg. 6138, 6161 (Feb. 6, 2006) (describing a “principal incentive to conduct research ethically”);
Protection of Human Subjects, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,156, 28,156 (proposed May 22, 1997) (noting that the
proposed rule is “needed to secure additional protections for children who are involved as subjects
of research”).
154 Belmont Report, supra note 12.
155 King, supra note 13, at 137.
156 See Belmont Report, supra note 12, at 23,192 (capitalization omitted).
157 Id. at 23,193.
158 Id. at 23,194.
159 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 413 (1998).
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amount and kind of consent required to collect and use data, and the
importance of privacy protections.163
Second, justice as it is conceptualized today looks very different than its
Belmont avatar. The problem I grapple with raises the question of how to
distribute burdens. However, as Patricia King—another Report coauthor—
notes more recently, “the last thirty years” of bioethics have produced a
“dramatic change” where questions of justice are concerned.164 Ethicists now
emphasize “access” to the “benefits” of research rather than “protection,” from
its “risks and burdens.”165 If anything, research ethics is concerned with the
lack of inclusion of minorities and women in randomized control trials, rather
than the overinclusion of such groups.166
Third, apart from noting in passing that “social practices such as
punishment, taxation and political representation” engage with questions of
163 Different groups endorse the weighing of autonomy against health interests. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 325 (2000)
(“Legislation . . . cannot provide absolute privacy protection while still affording reasonable access
to data to achieve important public health purposes.”). The outcome of this balancing depends on
context. See I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using Complex
Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139, 1144 (2014) (“Predictive analytics falls
between two well-accepted models regarding consent. On the one hand, [it] resembles clinical
research, in which explicit consent is usually required. On the other hand, it also resembles quality
assurance or quality improvement activities, in which consent is not generally required.”); Don E.
Detmer, Your Privacy or Your Health—Will Medical Privacy Legislation Stop Quality Health Care?, 12
INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 1, 2 (2000) (“The issue resembles a teeter-totter with health
on one end and privacy on the other. Where one places the fulcrum of law beneath the board is
crucial.”). Of course, a key problem is that autonomy-seeking consent approaches do not work very
well because patients do not read or understand these policies. See Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains
for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 703 (2013) (noting that
most Americans do not understand the payment systems that American hospitals use).
164 King, supra note 13, at 136; see also Madison Powers, Theories of Justice in the Context of
Research (“A striking consequence of the egalitarian’s focus on goods such as income, wealth, and
health care, which persons need to flourish, is that the distribution of burdens and risks can remain
largely ignored in the analysis.”), in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 147, 150
(Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds., 1998); Charles Weijer, Evolving Ethical Issues in Selection of Subjects for
Clinical Research, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 334, 343 (1996) (noting that “a number
of issues, in succession [have been] viewed by ethicists to be the prime concern in the selection of
subjects for clinical research”).
165 King, supra note 13, at 136 (emphasis added).
166 See id.; see also Carol Levine, Changing Views of Justice After Belmont: AIDS and the Inclusion
of “Vulnerable” Subjects (“[R]esearchers . . . should not offer potentially beneficial research only to
some persons who are in their favor . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), in THE ETHICS OF
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: FACING THE 21ST CENTURY 105, 107 (Harold Y.
Vanderpool ed., 1996). Many argue that the shift resulted due to the legacy of HIV, where certain
groups were excluded from participation in HIV clinical trials in which the best medication was
available. See, e.g., Robert J. Levine, The Impact of HIV Infection on Society’s Perception of Clinical Trials,
4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 93, 95 (1994) (“AIDS activists . . . correctly pointed out that
enrollment in [the azidothymidine drug] clinical trial was the only way for HIV-infected persons to
get even a 50 percent chance of receiving the only therapy that offered any hope of delaying death
or the onset of opportunistic infections.”).
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burden–equity, the Report does not provide a burden–equity analysis.167
Since the literature has not had occasion to engage with the question since
then, a robust explanation is required.
A. Health Information Norms
In a 2016 discussion about precision medicine and the learning health
system, President Obama explained that we are building a shared communal
resource: “all of us . . . could have electronic medical records that . . . we
pool together . . . that researchers, practitioners, [and] scientists can
share.”168 This would require engagement from all segments of the
population: “from the private sector, from the public sector, from the nonfor-profit sector, from the medical community, [and] from researchers.”169
This shared purpose draws on intuitions of reciprocity. The President
was quick to emphasize that, as an initial matter, the data belonged to the
patient: “I would like to think that if somebody does a test on me or my
genes, that that’s mine.”170 But by providing the data that they owned,
individuals would be repaid in medical benefits, and their contributions
would allow us to “individualiz[e] treatments for a particular patient.”171 The
system will “give all of us access to the personalized information we need to
keep ourselves and our families healthier.”172 Thus, even as all individuals
contribute to the system, all individuals draw from it in various ways
The fairness and reciprocity that undergirds the President’s description
has broad intuitive appeal. Both popular and moral accounts deploy this kind
of reasoning in other contexts to justify pooling of resources. For example,
scholars and politicians have used solidarity- and reciprocity-based approaches to
justify tax policy.173
167
168
169

Belmont Report, supra note 12, at 23,194.
President Obama, Precision Medicine Panel Remarks, supra note 112.
Id. A former FDA Commissioner, Robert Califf, even suggested that it is a “patriotic” duty
to provide information. Darius Tahir, Administration with Big PMI Moves, POLITICO (July 7, 2016,
10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/07/administration-with-bigpmi-moves-congressional-roundup-cms-with-meaningful-use-tweaks-215208 [https://perma.cc/MF
G5-G6ER] (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 President Obama, Precision Medicine Panel Remarks, supra note 112.
171 Id.
172 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 20,
2015), transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarkspresident-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [https://perma.cc/QDB2-WMPM].
173 See Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and
Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 406 (2005) (explaining the new benefit principle of
taxation, which “purports to be a norm of tax fairness that . . . postulat[es] that the measure of a
person’s benefit from government is none other than his or her financial . . . well-being”); American
Community Survey (ACS): Is the American Community Survey Mandatory?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about/survey-is-mandatory.html [https://perma.cc/X
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Everyday moral reasoning assesses a particular activity based on the
norms of the context or institution in which it is situated—the particular law
school, family, or community. We decide if that is “the way we do things here.”
Thus, here, we consider only the processes generally attributed to the health
information system. We do not consider processes, resources, or people’s
social situations outside the system. Adopting this internal point of view
allows us to provide a prima facie assessment of the justice of the policies within
the health information system without grappling with the complications of a
broader perspective that accounts for other social institutions.
We know that contemporary health information policies facilitate a world
in which the poor and elderly, as a group, will provide most of the health
information. We also know they may enjoy unique benefits from the health
information system. Health information research, as explained above, can
roughly be divided into health care delivery research, carried out using claims
data, and clinical research, carried out using EHR data.174
Medicare and Medicaid are unique public health insurance programs with
health care delivery that can be sui generis due to their size and structure.
The claims data from these programs might reflect this uniqueness, and
research using that data could conceivably provide primary benefits for the
programs and their beneficiaries.
But clinical research that CMS policies will eventually produce will accrue
to everyone’s benefit.175 While there may be some conditions that are more
common among the poor and elderly, there is no major condition that is unique
to those groups of individuals. Adverse health events impact everyone. Yet, many
DJ8-W6MZ] [hereinafter ACS Survey] (emphasizing social unity to describe why the American
Community Survey is mandatory); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145,
1153 (2006). In fact, through regressive consumption taxes and graduated income taxes, President
Lincoln sought to send the message that “all Northern citizens were supporting the war equally,”
and Republican lawmakers “employ[ed] the rhetoric of patriotism and shared sacrifice to frame the
paying of new robust taxes as a form of loyalty to the Union.” Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Price of Conflict:
War, Taxes, and the Politics of Fiscal Citizenship, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1053, 1060-61 (2010). Similarly, as
historian Carol Jones argues, although dramatic expansion of the tax base during World War II hurt
the less well-off, it sent a solidarity-driven message: all citizens shared the cost of war. See Carolyn
C. Jones, Mass-Based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940–1952 (explaining that taxfocused “propaganda messages throughout the war used a theme of comparative sacrifice”), in
FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995, at 107, 114 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996);
see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (2006) (noting that
many governments used World War II “to greatly expand their income tax collections”).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 26–28.
175 The harms to which I point are not immediate, of course. The system has not yet completed
the process of making data available. Benefits are further down the line. See Mike Orcutt, The White
House Is Pushing Precision Medicine, but It Won’t Happen for Years, MIT TECH. REV. (July 18, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601883/the-white-house-is-pushing-precision-medicine-butit-wont-happen-for-years/ [https://perma.cc/TMA4-PM57] (“[W]e are many years from realizing
[the] ‘new era of medicine’ the [P]resident described in his 2015 State of the Union address . . . .”).

2017]

Governing Health Information

1353

individuals who are richer or younger will gain access to benefits without their
data ever being used in clinical research. And many have already raised concerns
that fewer benefits will accrue to the worse off as time goes on.176
And even when it comes to claims data, there is evidence to show that
commercial entities are seeking to use the data to improve the lot of the richer
from whom they can expect better remuneration. Take, for example, the
research program I describe above arising from the ACA and subsequent 2015
legislation.177 The ACA program originally forbade using data for purposes
other than CMS quality improvement (which excluded, for example,
generalizable secondary research that could benefit non-CMS beneficiaries as
well).178 Notwithstanding the statutory ban, research entities sought greater
freedom after the proposed rules were issued so that they could market a
greater range of private analyses that did not pertain to CMS quality
improvement.179 CMS, of course, pointed out that the statute prohibited such
broader uses.180
But the 2015 legislation changed the ACA standard to allow qualified
entities to perform any analysis, including secondary research for certain data
suppliers—such as providers, employers, and insurers.181 CMS noted that it
expected that the number of entities applying to use the data to increase due
to the more permissive 2015 regime.182 The policies therefore facilitate an
outcome that does not conform to basic intuitions of reciprocity and fair play,
by using the data of only CMS beneficiaries for everyone’s potential benefit.
To be sure, the system may not capture everyone’s data. One-and-a-half
percent of individuals will never interact with the medical system183 and
therefore may never gain from these data analyses. But the vast majority of
society should give back through health information contributions to the
system from which they draw. The only way to maintain the shared stake that
demands reciprocity is by requiring equitable contributions from all individuals.
176 See, e.g., Barbara Feder Ostrov, The Challenge of Taking Health Apps Beyond The Well-Heeled,
NPR (June 23, 2016, 8:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/06/23/483098999/
the-challenge-of-taking-health-apps-beyond-the-well-heeled [https://perma.cc/W25W-3Y6F] (discussing
the importance of “tailor[ing] digital health technologies to lower-income people not only to be fair, but
because they’re more likely to have chronic illnesses . . . that are expensive to treat”).
177 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
178 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed.
Reg. 76,542, 76,542 (Dec. 7, 2011).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See Medicare Program: Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81 Fed.
Reg. 5397, 5415 (Feb. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 401) (increasing access for nonpublic
analyses of data); see also id. at 5400 (discussing the details of how to identify providers and suppliers
of these now expanded analyses).
182 Id. at 5398.
183 See CDC STATISTICS, supra note 75.
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B. General Social Norms
Although everyday moral reasoning starts out with accounts internal to
specific contexts, those contexts are embedded within larger social structures.
Reflection often involves abstracting up and testing the robustness of our
intuitions against sets of moral norms that apply more generally. When
assessing a certain behavior, it is not enough to decide whether “it is the way
we do things here”; we also assess how the behavior comports with broader
social values about justice and fairness.
An example of this is the taxation system. In the abstract, one could argue
that the central goal of taxation is merely to provide for the upkeep of
government. Norms of equity and reciprocity may seem to counsel a flat tax
system with everyone contributing equally. But our existing system considers
a range of values that borrow from various other social norms such as justice,
equity, family, and mutual obligation.184 We consider the position of
individuals in society more generally—their income, health, age, and family
size—and we modulate contributions as well as payouts.185 Those with higher
incomes receive less and pay more.
184 See C. Eugene Steuerle, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All? (discussing seven adjustments made
to ensure equity in tax contributions including “income in-kind, potential income or consumption,
need, transfers paid and received prices, household size, and measurement period”), in TAX
JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 253, 273-78 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds.,
2002). Even if one just used income, what income metric should be used? See generally Alan J.
Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. ASS’N 1116 (2002),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7035.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS2K-U4GK] (discussing available models
by which to measure income); Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271 (2007) (defending the theory of luck egalitarianism, which
prioritizes personal responsibility in the context of redistributive justice). For example, even with
as fundamental a measure as income, some argue that potential income is a better measure than actual
income. See Steuerle, supra, at 274. The idea is that individuals should be compared based on the
potential income they may earn for fairness reasons. An individual who is able to earn more income
and contribute more to society—but chooses not to—should pay more than an individual whose
maximum potential is lesser, even if the latter actually earns more than the former. Second, those
who take such a position may argue that taxing actual income may disincentivize individuals from
maximizing income. But others respond that we cannot ethically force individuals to earn their
optimum income. Taxing the potential income of individuals who earn suboptimally is unethical
under the redistributive and benefit principles, and also impractical—a fool’s errand that seeks to
collect money that isn’t there. Finally, measuring actual income is feasible; measuring potential
income is not. Id. at 275. Accordingly, we rely on actual rather than potential income to assess taxes.
Similar to the income context, some may argue that potential—rather than actual health—is
the better criterion to use when calculating welfare. We should not treat an individual who does not
take care of her health with the same care as someone who suffers through no choice of her own.
But, as in the income context, we cannot always force individuals to engage in behaviors that are
optimal for their health. And it is then arguably unethical (though perhaps not impractical) to
increase burdens on those with poor health. Finally, measuring actual health is feasible. Measuring
potential health under current technology is not.
185 Steuerle, supra note 184, at 274.
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We do not always consider extra-contextual values. Some settings, such as
the military, are insulated from society as a whole such that broader norms
and standards of society do not always apply. But the health information
system is not such a setting; it is embedded within a larger social context from
which it draws and to which it contributes. The system relies on technology
developed in other contexts, as well as the taxes and premiums that support
the medical apparatus as a whole. Individuals who participate in those areas
indirectly support the health information system. In turn, as President Obama
noted, the system contributes back to society: it “promises to reduce costs,
provide much better care, [and] make our entire health care system much
more effective.”186 This allows society to focus its resources in other areas
from which we benefit.
Even those who never interact with the system may therefore benefit from
it indirectly.187 A law professor who never needs the doctor still depends on
the productivity of her colleagues and law review editors.188 The time she can
devote to her work depends in part on whether society can help address any
poor health experienced by those in her charge.189
Further, broader social contexts give us referents to value the contributions
that the system makes. How to value a cure, for example, depends largely upon
the real world effects of a disease on human functioning—which may differ from
human to human—and its prevalence. Some societies might penalize certain
kinds of bad health or devote resources to projects other than improving the
health of the unwell; others attempt to diminish hardship, invest in health
care, value jobs that require one to be able-bodied, and so on.190

186
187

President Obama, Precision Medicine Panel Remarks, supra note 112.
This responds to an objection by Iain Brassington against obligations for research
contributions that has remained unaddressed in the bioethics literature. See Iain Brassington, John
Harris’ Argument for a Duty to Research, 21 BIOETHICS 160, 162 (2007) (“[T]here is no problem with
free riding when the benefits of research that I enjoy are paid for by some sort of insurance.”).
188 See ALLEN JENKINS & RON KONECNY, NEBRASKA MEDICAID EXPANSION 33-35 (2015),
http://www.nebraskahospitals.org/file_download/inline/9eb5a4d7-8725-4385-959f-0f404c895128
[https://perma.cc/UZU5-TWMV] (“Programs that improve the health and vitality of workers
improve the quality of labor.”).
189 As Bill Sage notes, “One person’s malady can harm families, workplaces, clubs, churches,
and sometimes entire communities.” William M. Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, but Still American,
in THE HASTINGS CTS., CONNECTING AMERICAN VALUES WITH HEALTH REFORM 10, 10
(Mary Crowley ed., 2009).
190 See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 57 (2008)
(arguing that Rawls’s conception of primary social goods can be broadened to include “health-care
institutions among the basic institutions involved in providing for fair equality of opportunity”); see
also Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation,
and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 184-85 (2002) (arguing that “we should establish a fund that
we all contribute to equally [to] . . . cover[] the costs of [accommodating] any characteristic for
which the law has created a reasonable accommodation mandate”).
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As the health information system is embedded within a set of larger social
structures, we should consider theories of political obligation that apply to
society more generally. These theories tell us how an individual’s place in
society affects and constructs the kinds of claims she can make on society as
a whole, and the duties she owes. Those claims and obligations, in turn,
permeate all social contexts and affect assessments of fairness internal to
them, including those in the health information system.
Although this is not the place to advance a fully outlined theory of
political obligation, many such existing, mainstream theories support the
conclusion that data collection and its use for secondary research should be
carried out equitably.191 Some would argue that those who are richer or
younger gain a lot from society and therefore should pay society back and
that a poor and elderly individual owes less. Assisting more vulnerable groups
also accords with approaches that require that all individuals have certain
basic capabilities and autonomy. Theories of general utilitarianism may also
require redistribution toward the more vulnerable to improve social welfare
as a whole because the marginal improvements to the more vulnerable exceed
the losses to the better off. I do not pick among these theories, beyond noting
that their conclusion—that we should redistribute resources to assist the
worse off in many cases—undergirds many social and economic policies.
Indeed, some would claim that to achieve equity, we should redistribute
risk from the more vulnerable to the less vulnerable. Such a claim relies on
two premises. Many believe that society currently does not do enough to help

191 Such theories are usually far more complex than the simple, intuitive, reciprocity claims
that I deploy—reciprocity by itself might prove indeterminate without some theory concerning
baseline rights and duties. Many political theorists, of course, share this intuition. Some more
famous approaches include Rawls’s difference principle, see J.E.J. Altham, Rawls’s Difference Principle,
48 PHILOSOPHY 75, 75 (1973) (“The difference principle states that the long-run expectations of the
least advantaged social group should be maximized.”), and Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s
capabilities approaches. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5 (2000) (“[T]he best approach to this idea of a basic social
minimum is provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what people are
actually able to do and to be . . . .”); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009) (outlining
the capability approach, which “in contrast with the utility-based or resource-based lines of thinking,
[notes that] individual advantage is judged . . . by a person’s capability to do things he or she has
reason to value”). Moreover, communitarian theories might impose duties to assist other members
of the community. See, e.g., Per Bauhn, The Extension and Limits of the Duty to Rescue, 3 PUB. REASON,
June 2011, at 39, 46 (“[W]e have a duty of necessity to rescue someone whose basic well-being is
endangered . . . .”). A benefit theory might suggest that the rich gain more from living in society so
they owe more back to it. See YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 132 (1993) (discussing the theory of
political obligations which views them as “way[s] of paying the debts one owes the state, following the
enjoyment of benefits and services one has received from it”). See generally JOHN HORTON, POLITICAL
OBLIGATION (2010).
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vulnerable individuals—at least low-income individuals.192 This claim is both
descriptive and normative. As a normative matter, the claim first assumes that
there is a particular level of assistance and basic goods that is owed to all
individuals. As a descriptive matter, the claim next asserts that this society
does not meet that obligation. Society therefore has an obligation to alleviate
the burdens on the poor and elderly through available means, including through
the health information system.
Each of these intuitions is subject to challenge. First, my normative claim
that we must help those who are vulnerable may be questioned. Countervailing
theories assert that those who are worse off in society are owed nothing.193
Such theorists may indeed argue that since they are owed nothing in the first
place, those who receive Medicare and Medicaid are getting a windfall, and—
if anything—should be repaying society. Those with this set of moral priors
will not find my claims here persuasive, but making a case against their
foundational claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
Others might accept the normative claim that we should help the vulnerable,
but might reject the descriptive claim, believing that we help the vulnerable too
much or just enough. Those who believe we are helping the vulnerable too much
would likely approve of the current system to some extent. Like those who
reject my normative premise, they may see health information inequity as an
appropriate way of extracting repayment. Those who believe that we already
help the vulnerable just enough would not want the health information
system to disturb the status quo. Vulnerable individuals do not need to repay
anything, but they also do not deserve any additional solicitude. For this
group then, the additional burdens (and benefits) that come from the health
information system should be distributed equally. But even for this group, the
existing system, which distributes burdens unequally, should be adjusted.
C. Correcting Inequity
Inequity can be remedied in three ways. First, we may “level up,”
eliminating the new data collection programs and alleviating the burden on
everyone. Second, we may compensate by providing the harmed group with
an offsetting benefit. Third, we may “level down” by imposing the burden on
everyone.
The Introduction notes that the first solution is not off the table. Many
believe that enhanced data collection is morally problematic or socially
inefficient and that it should be stopped. As a normative matter, I believe that
192 For examples of scholars that rely on the frameworks that I have discussed to make such an
argument, see DANIELS, supra note 190, at 15-16, and WIEBKE KUKLYS, AMARTYA SEN’S CAPABILITY
APPROACH: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS passim (2005).
193 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 193-94 (1974).
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there is no perfectly clear answer here—the relative weight of privacy versus
health will depend on an individual’s history, circumstances, and cultural
background. Procedural mechanisms such as the regular democratic process,
which helps address clashing and incommensurate values and priorities
among individuals, will determine the direction in which we must go.
As a practical matter, that process—for the time being and with bipartisan
support—has put in place a system that will result in enhanced data collection
and use.194 It is highly unlikely that we will reverse course. But it is entirely
possible that including richer individuals within the information dragnet will
create resistance to the program, thereby changing the direction of information
policy and reducing collection for all. Although I refer to this outcome as
“leveling up,” it will actually affect a redistribution of wellbeing. Those who are
not on public benefit programs would no longer be able to harness the advantages
of research with the data of public beneficiaries. While those on the programs
would also lose out on the benefits, they would also no longer be burdened and
would therefore be relatively better off. This would be a sufficient solution to the
equity problems I raise here.
Second, one may offer offsets to individuals who suffer burdens. Indeed,
some may say that individuals on public programs already receive offsets in
the form of free or reduced-cost medical care. Further, we may also reasonably
conclude that the analyses that come from the data will be most relevant to—
and most beneficial for—the groups who supply the data.195
However, neither argument carries weight. The first argument adopts an
inappropriate baseline for determining burdens and benefits. The previous
Section assumes a general theory of social obligation, under which we owe
duties to those who are poor, elderly, or otherwise vulnerable:196 the
beneficiaries of public programs therefore receive no more than is their due
under benefit programs. It is thus inaccurate to portray these as offsets.197
Next, while public benefit recipients do benefit from the outcomes of
these analyses, I have explained at length why they are not the only ones to
benefit.198 For an offsetting benefit to create equity, it should only be given to
those who suffer the harm. Distributing it across society, even to some degree,
would render everyone better off, but still unequal.
194 See Brady Letter, supra note 56, at 2 (“Access to protected [Medicare] data serves as a
resource to look into the Medicare program’s costs, services, and trends.”).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75.
196 See supra Section III.B.
197 It is also incorrect to argue that the worse off are, by incurring risk for the good of others,
“paying back” into the system. It is only just to obligate individuals to “pay back” if they owe
something in the first place. But since the worse off obtain benefits because of independent moral
considerations, they do not owe society anything—it is unjust to force them to repay what they do not owe.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 175–76.
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Even if one concedes that all of society unfairly benefits from the burdens
on Medicare and Medicaid recipients, to restore fairness, one might seek ways
to ensure only that those who give data ultimately get access to the results of
the analyses. But how could we implement this? For example, imagine that a
doctor learns information about treating diabetes in children of a certain age.
It is both impractical and unethical for her to apply this information when
treating a child on Medicaid but ignore it when treating a diabetic child who
does not receive Medicaid.
But perhaps we could provide Medicaid and Medicare recipients other
kinds of compensation for taking their information. In principle, that
approach would bring us closer to equity. One could imagine a world in
which, in return for a Medicare or Medicaid recipient’s health data, we
provide more medical benefits, food stamps, or other benefits, according to
the recipient’s need. To prevent selection biases, we could not make this a
consent-based program, as some groups are more willing to provide their
data—whether or not in return for benefits—than others.199
While this approach would create a more equitable world, I remain
troubled by its symbolic, expressive effects.200 Why, instead of spreading the
data collection burdens across the population at minimal cost (as I propose
below),201 would we choose to focus them on a vulnerable group of individuals
and take their genetic, mental, or sexual history data? To what extent would
such disparate policies reinforce differences between social groups? Even if
the in-kind benefits outweigh any burdens at the individual level, one could
reasonably believe that there may be harms at group level. There may be longterm harms to the body politic even if an individual enjoys short term gains.202

199
200
201
202

See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.
See infra Section IV.B.
I limit my hypothetical to one where we provide recompense in kind rather than in money
because money is symbolically treacherous. Paying for something as intimately connected to an
individual as health information risks increasing commodification of an important resource. Cf., e.g.,
RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
158-72 (Vintage Books ed., 1972) (arguing against the commercialization of blood donation). Both
the research ethics literature and federal regulations treat monetary payments as posing autonomy
concerns in many instances. See Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL
INVESTIGATION 1681, 1683-84 (2005) (“Some worry that individuals with limited opportunities for
earning money may be most susceptible to impaired judgement when faced with an offer of money
. . . .”); see also ROBIN LEVIN PENSLAR & JOAN P. PORTER, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
PROTS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK ch. III, § G (2008). However, those claims are
highly contested in the literature. Others have suggested that aversion to such commercial transactions
is badly conceived. See, e.g., Stephen Wilkinson, Commodification Arguments for the Legal Prohibition
of Organ Sale, 8 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 189, 197-98 (2000) (arguing that commodification concerns
over payments in exchange for organs are misplaced).
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The third approach to achieving equity is to use information from
everyone for analyses. This “leveling down” approach would redistribute
burdens toward those not on CMS programs. Assume, for example, that a
particular research project requires one million records. The current framework
would enable the project to draw all the records from those on Medicare and
Medicaid, subjecting them to material and dignitary risks and harms. The
solution I adopt in the next Part would require the project to draw some of
these records from those not on CMS programs, easing the burden on CMS
beneficiaries as a group.
D. A Utilitarian Alternative
Some may have wondered why I have not simply adopted a utilitarian
approach to reach this solution, rather than relying on intuitions that not all
might share. A utilitarian approach balances the burden to the individual
(often measured both objectively and subjectively) against the benefit to
health across society in general.203 A purely utilitarian approach will assert
that contributions that optimize health across society at the least possible cost
to the individual are just—though more complex variations are possible.
Nonetheless, as we shall see, most varieties of a utilitarian principle prove
inconclusive for my purpose, so I do not explore them in depth.204
A utilitarian approach would optimize the process and maximize research
benefits while minimizing burdens on individuals. Maximizing benefits might
require us to collect data across social groups to have a well-functioning health
information system. Although data from public benefit programs may be
obtained cheaply, the data is also heavily biased toward elderly and lowincome individuals, and such bias can taint research.205
For example, research shows that some social determinants may predict
health outcomes better than genetic factors.206 Social conditions can also alter
203 Risks must be “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the
importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2)
(2005); see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000) (noting that HIPAA balances the “needs of the individual with the
needs of society”).
204 See infra text accompanying note 208.
205 Much of the literature on secondary health research has focused on the problem of bias—
individuals in minority and various other groups are less likely to provide their information, which
generates biases in statistical studies. This prevents scientists from drawing robust conclusions
regarding disease profiles and the effects of various behavioral, environmental, and other
characteristics on health. See, e.g., NASS ET AL., supra note 4, at 209-14 (noting that “many small
health care entities . . . serving disadvantaged populations are not participating in research[,] . . .
[which] results in the underrepresentation of minority populations in many research studies”).
206 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Debating the Cause of Health Disparities: Implications for Bioethics and
Racial Equality, 21 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 332, 333 (2012) (“It has been firmly
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genetic expression, confounding the research pool.207 Accordingly, relying on
data that is biased towards certain social groups can have problematic effects.
Thus, the current system of collection might yield suboptimal social goods—
biased data—relative to its autonomy harms. To prevent this, we might collect
data from all individuals—or at least a representative sample. For example,
the United States Census Bureau collects data from only a small sample of
Americans each year.208
Yet, I do not delve deeply into a utilitarian approach because of a key
problem—we simply do not have enough information to properly weigh costs
and benefits. Although more data will be valuable, collecting data from nonCMS populations could be expensive. If the government is the collecting
entity, it must regulate private entities’ data quality, compel collection or
sampling, and then combine the data for research. And there will be
coordination costs if private data collectives run such programs. Incurring
these costs without knowing the exact value gained from particular kinds of
research is problematic. While social determinants of health are important,
so are genetic determinants. It may therefore be cheaper to rely solely on
CMS data and focus on genetic or other kinds of research in which biases in
the dataset do not matter as much. Thus, although a utilitarian approach may
well favor equity, given our current knowledge, I cannot predict how it will
eventually cut.209
established that the best predictor of health is an individual’s position in the social hierarchy.
Hundreds of studies tracking the health of people along the social ladder show that health gradually
worsens as status declines.”); see also Harry J. Heiman & Samantha Artiga, Beyond Health Care: The
Role of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/beyond-health-care-the-role-of-socialdeterminants-in-promoting-health-and-health-equity/ [https://perma.cc/K5KC-EQDC] (discussing
how the ACA can help expand access to health coverage for underserved populations); NCHHSTP Social
Determinants of Health: Frequently Asked Questions, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/socialdeterminants
/faq.html [https://perma.cc/HUB5-YQ6X] (last updated Mar. 21, 2014) (discussing the numerous
social determinants of health, such as education and income).
207 See Alison Gopnik, Poverty’s Vicious Cycle Can Affect Our Genes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014,
10:10 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/genes-play-a-role-in-poverty-1411567833 [https://perma.cc/
UU7Y-F75W] (“Twenty percent of American children grow up in poverty, and this number has been
rising, not falling. Nearly a million are maltreated. The new studies show that this damages children,
and perhaps even their children’s children, at the most fundamental biological level.”).
208 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DESIGN AND
METHODOLOGY (JAN. 2014): CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE DESIGN AND SELECTION 1 (2014), https://
www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology/design_and_methodology/acs_design_
methodology_ch04_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4ZD-WTDN] (“Each year . . . , we selected
approximately 2.9 million [housing unit] addresses in the [United States].”).
209 Further, even if we had all the relevant facts, the cost–benefit analysis faces problems of
valuation and time horizon. What, for example, is the appropriate timeframe? In assessing the value
of longitudinal data, should we consider the potential benefits that will accrue ten years from now?
One-hundred years from now? How exactly should we value individual autonomy in the balance?
Will those values remain the same over time?
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IV. USING LAW TO ACHIEVE EQUITY
Law provides a discrete set of policy levers to achieve equity. First,
adjusting Medicare and Medicaid, all-payer claims databases, and HIPAA
regulations and policy can alleviate collection inequity. Next, additional
regulations should be introduced to alter whose data is used in research and
analysis. Lastly, all of the recommendations I offer require a restructuring of
health information coordination tasks within HHS. Unless otherwise stated,
I take it for granted that none of the solutions I offer present any constitutional
challenges under existing law.210
A. Collection
1. EHR Data
CMS can require EHR data reporting from patients with private
insurance. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 gives CMS the authority to decrease fees for
“covered . . . services” if a provider is not a “meaningful EHR user.”211 The
Secretary has broad discretion to determine whether the use of data is
“meaningful.” Meaningful use includes “using certified EHR technology in a
meaningful manner,” and reporting on measures using EHR “in a form and
manner specified by the Secretary, on such . . . measures as selected by the
Secretary.”212 The Secretary may “requir[e] more stringent measures of
meaningful use” as time progresses.213
The Secretary also has broad discretion to define what makes a provider
a meaningful user of health information. While she can adjust payments for
services provided under Medicare and Medicaid, the reporting does not need

210 In the health context, the Supreme Court has shown little appetite for questioning policy
decisions regarding health information collection under the Constitution. In Whalen v. Roe, the
closest on-point case, the Court rejected just such a challenge. See 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977)
(upholding the constitutionality of a state statute that required records of prescriptions for certain
dangerous drugs be sent to the Department of Health as “a reasonable exercise of [the state’s] broad
police power”); see also Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting a due
process challenge to the HIPAA routine data use exception).
211 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(7)(i) (2012); see also id. § 1395w-4(o)(1)(A) (providing for incentive
payments to meaningful EHR users but not after 2016).
212 Id. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(A)(i), (iii). The Secretary must publish the measures in advance in the
Federal Register. Id. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(B)(i)(II). The Secretary must also “provide [a] preference” to
clinical quality measures endorsed by the National Quality Forum. Id. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). The
Forum provided a set of preliminary measures in 2011. See generally NAT’L QUALITY FORUM,
IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL 2013 E-QUALITY MEASURES (2011), http://www.qualityforum.org/
Publications/2011/02/Meaningful_Use_Final_Report.aspx [https://perma.cc/SC3N-2Q3V].
213 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(A)(iii).
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to concern those services. In other words, the Secretary could impose payment
penalties for not reporting non-CMS beneficiaries’ information.214
“[V]irtually all” hospitals215 and over 90% of primary care providers accept
Medicare or Medicaid and would be affected by such penalties.216 As CMS
has issued almost yearly updates on appropriate reporting measures and
methodologies on meaningful use since the program’s inception,217 slowly
incorporating the reporting of nonbeneficiary data is a viable approach.218
All this data would be made available to the Patient Centered Outcomes
Research Institute for secondary research under the ACA. Recall that CMS
must “make available to the Institute such data collected . . . under” Medicare
and Medicaid.219 The data would be reported “under” an incentive program
connected to Medicare and Medicaid.
As technology develops, we may consider alternative approaches to
collecting data from all patients. One potential method is an interactive
sampling approach in which the CMS data registry program looks at the patient’s
profile and only accepts the data of those who are underrepresented in the
pool.220 Similarly, under a distributed architecture model, which I discuss
below,221 research would be done remotely, with no data collection.

214 CMS may have already realized that it has this authority. Under the meaningful use
program as it is currently constituted, providers must report certain clinical quality measures
(CQM). Id. These are usually aggregate calculations based on all of the patients the doctors have
seen. Thus, if the CQM is (number of minors taking certain medication) over (total number of
minors), the provider must include all minors in her practice, not just those receiving Medicaid. As
meaningful use transitions from seeking aggregate data reporting to transmission of granular EHRs,
CMS should make data available, not just of the recipients of public benefit recipients, but of all
individuals in the practice. As I explain below, this need not require CMS to collect the data itself.
See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
215 Senate Rules Comm., Bill Analysis: SB 233, Third Reading (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_233_cfa_20110518_160126_sen_floor.html [https://perma.cc/
S2S7-X95B].
216 Cristina Boccuti et al., Primary Care Physicians Accepting Medicare: A Snapshot, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/primary-care-physiciansaccepting-medicare-a-snapshot/ [https://perma.cc/J87Z-67BU].
217 See, e.g., 2016 Program Requirements, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/regulations-andguidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/2016programrequirements.html [https://perma.cc/D6U4-K64L]
(last updated Feb. 14, 2017).
218 What is key, of course, is for CMS to develop “the capacity to accept the information
electronically” as the statute requires. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(B)(ii).
219 Id. § 1320e(d)(3)(A).
220 See generally Mansurul Bhuiyan et al., Interactive Pattern Mining on Hidden Data: A SamplingBased Solution, in CIKM ’12, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 95 (2012), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
2396777 [https://perma.cc/VK8H-H9SK] (describing the process and benefits of interactive sampling).
221 See infra notes 240, 286 and accompanying text.
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2. Claims Data
Although EHR data collected through the CMS program will satisfy the
needs of most secondary clinical research, claims data also has additional
value for four reasons. First, and most importantly, under existing medical
technology, the meaningful use program is probably a few years away from
reasonably demanding that doctors report individual-level clinical measures.
Claims data, however, has long been and will continue to be transmitted.
Second, claims data contains information that EHR data lacks that is vital for
health delivery planning, such as the price of services. Third, claims data goes
back many years and therefore has “longitudinal depth.”222 Fourth, claims data
can be useful as a cross check of EHR data to minimize data error. Hence, some
secondary researchers argue that “neither claims data nor [EHR] data alone can
provide a complete, accurate, and timely view of a person’s health status.”223
Since the meaningful use program only gives CMS the authority to
require meaningful use of EHR data, it lacks the authority to demand claims
data. However, states have traditionally regulated insurance and created allpayer claims databases, as described above.224 The federal government has so
far not been involved in this effort in any substantial way.225
After a recent decision by the Supreme Court, this must change. In
Gobeille, the Court held that ERISA preempted states from requiring selffunded plans to report data.226 In explaining why, the Court relied on the
broad authority of the Department of Labor to require the reporting of
information from self-insured plans.227
222 Claims Data: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, FLOW HEALTH (May 16, 2014), http://blog.
flowhealth.com/claims-data-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/ [https://perma.cc/6HD8-HUAT].
223 WILSON & BOCK, supra note 25, at 4.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
225 But it has provided grants to build APCDs. See The Center for Consumer Information &
Insurance Oversight: Rate Review Grants, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/RateReview-Grants/index.html [https://perma.cc/T55F-GU7V] (describing the $250 million available to
states for reviewing health care costs, some of which goes to fund data centers).
226 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016); see also supra text
accompanying notes 65–67.
227 The Court details this authority in the following passage:

The Secretary also may, “in connection” with any research, “collect, compile,
analyze, and publish data, information, and statistics relating to” plans. [42 U.S.C.] §
1143(a)(1); see also § 1143(a)(3) (approving “other studies relating to employee benefit
plans, the matters regulated by this subchapter, and the enforcement procedures
provided for under this subchapter”).
ERISA further permits the Secretary of Labor to “requir[e] any information or data
from any [plan] where he finds such data or information is necessary to carry out the
purposes of” the statute, § 1024(a)(2)(B) . . . . The Secretary has the general power to
promulgate regulations “necessary or appropriate” to administer the statute, § 1135 . . . .
Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 944 (alteration in original) (italics added).
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So far, the Department of Labor has primarily sought information about
plan financing.228 However, as the Court discussed,229 the Department of
Labor can now work with the states (and HHS) to create a uniform system
of insurance information reporting.230 And with the Court’s implicit blessing,
such a plan is unlikely to face serious legal challenges, although other problems
would remain.231
Nonetheless, coordination will be required. A robust database requires
claims data from both self-insured and other plans, which is impossible for
one government level to achieve. ERISA prevents the Department of Labor
from devolving all authority to collect self-insured data to states, as the Court
was adamant that Congress did not intend for states to collect such data.232
On the other hand, federalism and administrative authority concerns will
prevent federal agencies from collecting data from all plans: ERISA gives the
Department of Labor authority over only self-insured plans and the ACA
gives HHS only limited data collection authority.233 A cooperative, voluntary
federal–state venture would bring together the data that falls within the
respective competencies of federal and state governments in a single data pool.234
228 See id. at 954 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“ERISA-covered benefit plans must . . . file annual
reports containing financial and actuarial data to . . . the Secretary of Labor . . . .”).
229 See id. at 944 (majority opinion) (explaining that ERISA oversight systems “are intended
to be uniform” across all fifty states); see also id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the grant
of authority allows state–federal cooperation).
230 Bill Sage also appears to suggest that Gobeille is a net positive for creating collaboration
between states and the federal government. William Sage, Out of Many, One: ERISA Preemption,
State All-Payer Claims Database Laws, and the Goals of Transparency, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 10,
2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/10/out-of-many-one-erisa-preemption-state-all-payer-clai
ms-database-laws-and-the-goals-of-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/VWZ2-CERR].
231 For example, information collected by the Secretary is “public information,” except certain
kinds of beneficiary information. 29 U.S.C. § 1026(a) (2012).
The Secretary “shall make” such information available in various contexts. Id. However, to avoid
constitutional problems, this requirement should, like CMS data, be read as subject to certain
privacy protections and subject to at least the same procedural collection requirements as CMS data.
For additional suggestions, see generally Bland et al., supra note 63, which discusses nonstate APCD
options for further data collection.
232 See Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 945 (majority opinion) (“[T]he uniform rule design of ERISA
makes it clear that [decisions concerning the exemption self-insured plans] are for federal
authorities, not for the separate States.”).
233 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(3)(A) (2012) (listing the type of data that health plans must submit
to the Secretary). Notably, the Department of Labor has relied on this specific authority in its
rulemaking, rather than the more general authority cited in Gobeille. See 136 S. Ct. at 944 (describing
the Secretary’s broad grant of authority to establish additional reporting and disclosure requirements
for ERISA plans).
234 Such a scheme would not be unprecedented. For example, “[t]he National (Nationwide)
Inpatient Sample . . . is the largest publicly available all-payer inpatient health care database in the
United States,” and was “[d]eveloped through a Federal-State-Industry partnership sponsored by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.” Overview of the National (Nationwide) Inpatient
Sample, H-CUP, https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/nisoverview.jsp [https://perma.cc/YVU6-4G7U].
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3. The HIPAA Exclusion
Some individuals will pay out of pocket, and their EHR and claims data
may never be included in the medical record as I explain above.235 Changing
this requirement would require amending the 2009 statute that put it into
place.236 Nonetheless, the ability to exclude information from health records
does serve some important purposes, and changes should be implemented
carefully. Preventing providers from transmitting certain information to
payers (and effectively, from including the information in the health record)
when the patient pays out of pocket can assist vulnerable patients. For
example, dependent children or spouses may want to conceal from the
primary policyholder (or anyone else with access) that they had sought birth
control or STD tests and may therefore pay out of pocket for the service.237
Thus, while the out-of-pocket data exemption may allow the rich to exempt
themselves from the data pool, it also allows certain individuals to take care
of their health, avoid domestic violence, and exercise their autonomy. A
nuanced statutory response is therefore necessary.
One possible solution is to require a provider to comply with the data
exclusion request only if the plan includes more than one member. In other
cases, providers could be required to collect and enter health information.
This allows vulnerable individuals to withhold data from the policyholder but
would include the remaining data within the secondary research data pool.
4. Data Collection from the Healthy
As I explain above,238 healthier individuals escape information burdens
even though their information can be extremely useful. Incentives should be
introduced to encourage checkups that would both improve preventative
medicine and allow for systematic health information collection from the
healthy. In the meantime, data from wellness programs can help close the gap.
First, we could institute tax incentives for preventative care and checkups for
healthy individuals. Just as individuals must now generally carry health insurance,
individuals would be required to go to the doctor to ensure that any diseases can
be detected early and addressed more effectively at the least cost to society, and

235
236

45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(vi) (2013); see also supra text accompanying note 69.
See 42 U.S.C. § 17935(a) (outlining when entities must comply with an individual’s request
to restrict the disclosure of protected health information under 45 C.F.R. § 164.522).
237 See Laura Covarrubias, The Girls’ Guide to Getting Some Privacy on Your Parents’ Health
Insurance, BEDSIDER (May 16, 2013), https://bedsider.org/features/275-the-girls-guide-to-gettingsome-privacy-on-your-parents-health-insurance [https://perma.cc/2X52-JLTK] (providing tips for
how to conceal treatments from parents while remaining on their health insurance).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 75–78.
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that their information can be used to benefit society as a whole.239 States might
also mandate such checkups within their police power as they do vaccines. Other
countries, such as Japan, are close to having similar requirements.240
Until the point where such a program can be enacted, we might rely on
wellness programs, where employers, rather than states, incentivize individuals
to get checkups. These programs, which the ACA encourages, often offer
incentives in the form of premium discounts or gift cards for participating
employees of up to 30% of the premium amount.241 Incentives may also be
tied to certain biometric outcomes that require employees to be tested for
cholesterol, blood pressure, or body mass index. Some programs also allow
testing for nicotine exposure.242
There are many problems with wellness programs beyond the scope of
this Article.243 However, for our purposes, what is key is that data from
wellness programs will never become part of either EHR or claims reporting.

239 At least one major presidential primary candidate has supported this approach in the past.
See Amy Lorentzen, Edwards Backs Mandatory Preventive Care, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2007, 8:06
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090200743.html
[https://perma.cc/4S6N-9BW6] (reporting that in 2007, John Edwards proposed a mandatory
preventative care measure as part of his universal health care plan). Others have promoted similar
ideas more recently. See, e.g., Dan Mangan, Take an ‘Unsick Day’: Paid Time Off for Your Health-Care
Checkups, CNBC (Oct. 11, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/10/take-an-unsick-daypaid-time-off-for-your-health-care-checkups.html?source=twitter [https://perma.cc/F6DP-DZPF]
(proposing a mandatory paid day off solely for the use of annual checkups and other preventive
care). This approach, they argue, will reduce costs on the medical system and save lives.
240 See Mami Maruko, Simple Tests Fill Health-Check Gaps, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/30/reference/simple-tests-fill-health-check-gaps/#.WSO
hFJOzJ3I [https://perma.cc/AZ56-5TLX] (“[H]ealth checkups are often mandatory for corporate
or institutional employees . . . .”); see also Tom Lomax, What to Expect when Undergoing a Medical
Check-Up in Japan, JAPAN TODAY (May 27, 2013, 6:29 AM), https://japantoday.com/category/feat
ures/health/what-to-expect-when-undergoing-a-medical-check-up-in-japan [https://perma.cc/F9V
H-YTQK] (“[R]egulations fall short of making it compulsory for employees to have an annual
medical. However, government incentives are in place in larger firms to ensure that a high percentage of
staff complete their check-up and file the report with their firm. This can lead to staff being pursued to
have a medical even if they don’t want one.”).
241 See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. 33,158, 33,158 (June 3, 2013) (allowing premium discounts “in return for adherence to certain
programs of health promotion and disease prevention”). The Affordable Care Act amended the
HIPAA nondiscrimination and wellness provisions. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
242 See Kristin Madison, The ACA, the ADA, and Wellness Program Incentives, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (May 13, 2015), https://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/13/the-aca-the-ada-and-wellnessprogram-incentives/ [https://perma.cc/Y9T5-Y9LU] (providing an overview of wellness programs
and the respective federal regulation).
243 For a good overview of the problems, see generally Special Issue: The Law and Politics of
Workplace Wellness, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 955 (2014).
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Although there is scant information about these programs,244 they can easily
serve as data siphons for healthy individuals. Healthy individuals with jobs,
who would otherwise have gone to doctors for annual checkups, can now
confirm their own good health without ever contributing information to the data
pool. Combining data from these programs into EHRs will create efficiencies,
improve data protection, and address inequities in data collection and use.
For wellness data to be collected, federal entities would likely have to
intervene once more. After Gobeille, states are likely preempted from collecting
such data. However, the ACA can be read to provide such authority to HHS and
Labor. For example, it allows the departments to collect data for reports, and
it gives them authority to promulgate additional regulations “in connection”
with wellness programs.245
5. Other Data Collection Policies
Apart from slight alterations to existing regulatory and legal regimes, it
may be possible to put into place stronger collection measures to ensure data
collection from all providers, not just the vast majority that accept Medicare and
Medicaid. This more intrusive approach would extend reporting requirements
even further.
States are best poised to impose this requirement. As the respondent
observed during Gobeille oral arguments, instead of having self-insured plans
report to all-payer claims databases, states could require providers to report
claims data to the state.246 This could extend to the reporting of EHR
information as well. The federal government could then coordinate with the
states to ensure uniform reporting.
Most states and the federal government currently lack the infrastructure
and funding to establish such a program, and the incremental CMS-led
program that I have proposed is more practical for now. However, several
states are developing “health information exchanges.”247 Most of these entities
focus only on data exchange between providers for treatment purposes. As the
schemes progress, they should permit remote queries for clinical research purposes

244 See Madison, supra note 242 (“[H]igh-quality evidence on the impact of employer wellness
incentives is in short supply.”).
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(n) (2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the
Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, or the Treasury from promulgating regulations in
connection with this section.”); see also id. § 300gg-4(m)(2) (permitting collection of additional data from
employers who provide employees with access to wellness programs).
246 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016)
(No. 14-181).
247 See generally PRASHILA DULLABH ET AL., NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., EVALUATION
OF THE STATE HIE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PROGRAM (2016).
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as well.248 And the federal government should continue recently introduced efforts
to assist such exchanges.249
Congress could also probably impose collection requirements on large
insurers and providers under its commerce power. It could also nudge states
by providing limited incentives to impose such requirements over time.250
Finally, it has also worked directly with providers to encourage data sharing.
The Institute, for example, has set up links with numerous private networks
to collect data,251 and President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative seeks
to do the same.252 These programs’ guiding bodies must carefully assess which
entities to include within these networks as part of a strategic plan to ensure
that information collection burdens are widely distributed population-wide.
B. Research
This Article is focused primarily on the burdens of information collection,
and changes in that process should be the first step toward equity. However,
once collected, the data is then passed on to other entities for analysis. Each
transfer or query of health information increases the risk of breach and the
harms of commodification. There may be data breaches at the time of
transmission, but also within research facilities.
We must, at the very least, ensure that risk is equally distributed across
groups. We can do so in various ways. For example, individuals whose data
has been involved in multiple studies may suffer a higher risk of reidentification
or breach than others, so their data should be exempted at some point if
possible.253 We must also introduce steps to assess the background of the patient
248 I should note that the new version of the Common Rule will only require institutional
review board (IRB) approval from one IRB per research project in certain cases. Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7208 (Jan. 19, 2017). Thus, a single approval
would be sufficient for a researcher to get access to data statewide for a specific project.
249 The federal government has provided assistance to these exchanges consistently. Most
recently, however, it has declined to mandate such exchanges: “[W]e do not believe it is appropriate
for us to require or mandate this option, as states may have various options or paths to increase
EHR and HIE adoption outside of their managed care contracts.” Medicaid and Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP) Programs; Medicaid Managed Care, CHIP Delivered in Managed
Care, and Revisions Related to Third Party Liability, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,497, 27,649 (May 6, 2016).
250 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (delineating the limits on
“Congress’s power under the Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal objectives”).
251 See supra note 44.
252 THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 40.
253 See Comment Letter from Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney, Elec. Frontier Found., to Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. Regarding the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Human Subjects
Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay,
and Ambiguity for Investigators, Docket ID number HHS–OPHS–2015–0008, at 8 (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/01/07/eff_common_rule_nprm_comment.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB7
T-WFPA] (proposing such an exemption).
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whose data is used to make sure that the burdens are spread across various
social groups. At first, such an assessment would be based on a rough calculus
that looks at how the patient paid for care and other demographic
information. As time goes on and more data is collected in medical records,
including social determinants of health, other, more exact parameters will
include income information and other measures of welfare, ranging from age
to family size or disability, as in the taxation context.254
As I explain in Section III.B, however, some may argue that we should
impose higher burdens on the better off.255 One might argue that all else being
equal, we should use the data of individuals with less hardship for research.256
For example, research seeking to identify the genetic determinants of a
specific disease may not require representation from all socioeconomic groups.
And as a general matter, depending on the study and the relevant statistical
method, only a certain number of records need to be included to yield the
appropriate statistical confidence.257 In cases where selection bias is minimal,
we might focus information burdens on the richer and younger by prioritizing
their information for transmission to researchers. Information coming from
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries should be exempt to a greater degree.

254 CMS has the ability to cross-reference data with beneficiary financial information.
Medicare Parts B and D have income sensitive premiums. Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman,
Medicare’s Income-Related Premiums: A Data Note, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 3, 2015),
http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicares-income-related-premiums-a-data-note/ [https://perma.cc/
A4K2-MK94]; see also Means-Testing of the Medicare Part B Premium, NAT’L COMMITTEE TO
PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE (July 2009), http://www.ncpssm.org/Document/ArticleID/
777 [https://perma.cc/EG9F-GLM7] (“[T]he Social Security Administration (SSA) automatically
determines the amount of the Medicare Part B premium using tax records filed with the Internal
Revenue Service two or three years previously.”).
255 See Belmont Report, supra note 12, at 23, 196-97 (“Some populations, especially institutionalized
ones, are already burdened in many ways by their infirmities and environments. When research is proposed
that involves risks and does not include a therapeutic component, other less burdened classes of persons
should be called upon first to accept these risks of research.”).
256 Those who reject such graduated risk distribution and argue that risk should be equally
distributed across all individuals would reject this scheme.
257 See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: UPDATE ON THE ADOPTION OF HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND RELATED EFFORTS TO FACILITATE THE ELECTRONIC USE
AND EXCHANGE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 21-22 (2014), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/
default/files/rtc_adoption_and_exchange9302014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P5T-S2HA] (describing
the Comprehensive Primary Care initiative, which “[i]n an effort to reduce providers’ quality
reporting burden, . . . leverages the EHR Incentive Programs to measure quality by using a subset
of the clinical quality measures specified for reporting”); see also THE PRECISION MEDICINE
INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining statistical power requirements in nested unmatched casecontrol design, which limit the number of people required to achieve desired levels of confidence in
case control studies).
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Information coming from self-paid patients, or those in higher priced insurance
plans, may be subject to greater use.258
There are of course limits to this goal of equitable adjustment. Analyses
involving, for example, social determinants of health, are often biased based
on population. In those cases, we must seek and use the information of those who
are worse off to make sure that they remain represented in the data.
When researchers seek data, IRB protocols should take into account
equity principles and consider how the data request can be structured to
distribute burdens equitably. CMS and its contractors can continue to review
research requests, but in doing so, should also consider and discuss equitybased considerations with researchers.
C. Coordination
Perhaps the biggest problem that faces the modern health information
effort is that policymakers and scholars understand it through the traditional
lens of health information collection during public health emergencies.
Traditional collection does not comprise a single system. Each act of
collection is justified by an immediate purpose—stopping a particular
outbreak or running a specific trial. Each program is therefore “ad hoc . . . [:]
the laws have developed by putting out fires, without comprehensive planning
for modern public health problems.”259
Because of this, policy and academic approaches also treat each act of
collection as a standalone enterprise.260 Considerations advanced with respect
to one health collection project, such as increasing the number of providers
that are part of CMS’s meaningful use program, may prove completely
inapplicable with respect to other health information projects such as the FDA’s
post-market drug surveillance. Each subagency has collected information for
agency specific projects: the FDA, for example, collects prescription data,

258 See Health Plan Categories, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/healthplan-categories/ [https://perma.cc/Y6US-5SQ6].
259 Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 476 (1986).
260 A small group of scholars arguably provide a systematic approach by suggesting the creation
of a national information market where trusted intermediaries can hold and sell the information—
recouping gains for the benefits of the patients and perhaps their providers. See Mark A. Hall,
Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 638
(2010) (arguing that “patients [should be allowed] to license limited rights to their medical
information with trusted and regulated intermediaries”); see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 324-25 (1967) (“[Personal information . . . should be defined as a property right, with all
the restraints on interference by public or private authorities and due-process guarantees [of] our
law of property . . . .”). But there is no indication that policy is moving in that direction, nor any
guarantee that this will increase information access. Further, it would be nearly impossible to create
a reliable and unbiased health information source with this approach.
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CMS collects Medicare data, and so on.261 This may, in some cases, lead to
waste and duplication—one can imagine multiple agencies accessing data
from the same doctors regarding the same patients. This has prevented us
from developing any systemwide principles or goals with which to evaluate
health collection efforts at a more general level.
The changes I recommend will require some form of coordination among
government entities, resulting in the formation of a single entity or task force.
This entity must oversee data coordination efforts through CMS, FDA, the
Department of Labor, state claims databases, wearable devices, wellness
programs, and consumer health initiatives. It must then ensure that data is
accessed for research in ways that are fair by keeping track of all research
projects. Where possible, the data of the same individuals or groups should
not be used in a multitude of projects: risks should be evenly distributed. In
addition to ensuring fairness, the entity could also play a role in curating data
quality by coordinating data collection formats and avoiding data redundancy.
This entity could also develop an optimum multi-database computational
approach, though designers may also need to consider latency costs and
duplication.262 As it currently stands, researchers may have to collect data
from multiple sources and manipulate it in various ways to ensure that the
metrics employed are congruent. With appropriate technology and standards,
data need never be collected: all research queries could be done remotely.

261 Medicare Part D data, that is, prescription data, might conceivably overlap with the data
that the FDA collects through its Sentinel program which carries out post market surveillance of
drug incidents. See infra note 262.
262 Carol Diamond explains that in such a model, “personally identified information is held
only at the source, and data are cleaned and analyzed in a common way . . . before being sent in a
standardized format.” Carol C. Diamond et al., Collecting and Sharing Data for Population Health: A
New Paradigm, 28 HEALTH AFF. 454, 459 (2009). Diamond, however, warns of a potential latency
effect. See id. at 458 (“[M]any forms of analysis are significantly delayed, including those that should
ideally be close to real time . . . .”). Distributed approaches may be fine for long-term tracking
systems like the FDA’s mini-Sentinel system, see generally FDA, MINI-SENTINEL: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES (2013) (describing the Sentinel Initiative, a “long-term, multifaceted effort to create a
national electronic system for monitoring the safety of FDA-regulated medical products”), but
cannot work for real-time public health interventions. There may also be duplication issues without
centralized storage. See CLAUDIA GROSSMANN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE FOR A LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 114-15, 150-51 (2010)
(noting that the “chief disadvantage of [a distributive research network] is the patient deduplication
issue”). Data lake approaches may offer a new alternative. See Kerry Raminiak, Data Lakes and the
Promise of Unsiloed Data, PWC (May 6, 2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology-forecast/2014/
cloud-computing/features/data-lakes.html [https://perma.cc/M24A-DQYG] (describing how Data
lakes allow “disparate records to be stored in their native formats for later parsing, rather than forcing
all-or-nothing integration up front as in a data warehousing scenario”). Another alternative is a
system that collects core data elements in a central location with the remaining elements distributed,
as envisaged in the Precision Medicine Initiative. THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE, supra
note 6, at 37.
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There are three potential candidates for the coordinating role. The Patient
Centered Outcomes Research Institute has been given the responsibility of
developing, disseminating, prioritizing, and contracting for research to “assist
patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health
decisions.”263 It has the authority to “identify national priorities for research”
through cost–benefit analysis.264 It may “also request and obtain data from
Federal, State, or private entities, including data from clinical databases and
registries.”265 The Institute itself is not a government entity,266 but is instead
administered by a board of representatives from numerous private and public
organizations.267 It is therefore well-positioned to work with all stakeholders
in collecting data and disseminating research.
Nonetheless, this strength might also be a weakness. For the Institute to
create data collection initiatives that carry the force of law, it would need to
become a government entity. Cooperation with other agencies might be
undermined if private citizens sit on its board. Furthermore, the Institute is
supported by a trust fund without additional appropriation.268 The amount in the
trust fund is insufficient to support incentive programs for data collection such
as meaningful use.
Next, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is a subagency
within HHS. One of the Agency’s purposes is to “enhance . . . health
services” through a range of health-delivery and clinical research,269 provide
research grants,270 and issue clinical guidelines.271 In particular, it is tasked with
several data-focused objectives. It must assess “the utility and comparability of
health information data and medical vocabularies by addressing issues related
to the content, structure, definitions and coding of such information,” and
must promote “the use of computer-based health records in all settings.”272
Further, the Secretary, acting through the Director, “shall provide for the
coordination of relevant Federal health programs . . . including the
development . . . of . . . health outcomes research data networks, in order to

263
264
265
266

42 U.S.C. § 1320e(c) (2012).
Id. § 1320e(d)(1)(A).
Id. § 1320e(d)(3)(A).
See id. § 1320e(b)(1) (noting that the Institute “is neither an agency nor establishment of
the United States Government”).
267 Id. § 1320e(f) (outlining the representatives from each industry that must comprise the
Board of Governors).
268 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(b)(3).
269 Id. § 299(b).
270 Id. § 299(a).
271 See FRIENDS OF AHRQ, AHRQ: 15 YEARS OF TRANSFORMING CARE AND IMPROVING
HEALTH 8 (2014) (“[AHRQ] provides physicians . . . detailed information on evidence-based
clinical practice guidelines.”).
272 42 U.S.C. § 299b-3(a)(5)–(6).
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develop and maintain a comprehensive, interoperable data network to collect,
link, and analyze data on outcomes and effectiveness from multiple sources,
including electronic health records.”273
However, the Agency’s mandate is too broad. Other priorities include
developing decision aids to assist patients and doctors with shared
decisionmaking.274 Second, it lacks authority with respect to data collection.
At most, it can expect “voluntary collaboration” from private entities.275
Third, it lacks authority even with respect to federal data networks: although
it has the authority to issue data collection standards, “where [these] standards
. . . may affect the administration of other [HHS] programs . . . , they shall be
in the form of recommendations to the Secretary for such program.”276
Indeed, the ACA deliberately put into place the Institute,277 which replicates
many of the Agency’s functions. The Agency is tasked with assisting the Institute
in “dissemination of the Institute’s research findings.”278
The final candidate for coordinating the secondary research network is
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology.
The Office was established in 2004, by executive order.279 The HITECH Act
established this subagency by statute five years later to further the
“development of a nationwide health information technology infrastructure
that allows for the electronic use and exchange of information” in order to
“improve[] health care quality, reduce[] medical errors, reduce[] health
disparities, . . . advance[] the delivery of patient-centered medical care,” and
“facilitate[] health and clinical research and health care quality.”280 The
Coordinator is given the task of “updat[ing] the Federal Health IT Strategic
Plan . . . to include specific objectives, milestones, and metrics.”281
Yet, when it comes down to brass tacks, the Coordinator lacks the
authority to do much beyond issue technical specifications. His primary tasks
are to “review and determine whether to endorse [health information technology]
standard[s], implementation specification[s], and certification criteri[a],” and to
“review Federal health information technology investments.”282 Incentive
program money is not siphoned through the Office. Rather, the Secretary
273
274
275
276
277

Id. § 299b-37(f).
Id. § 299b-36.
Id. 299b-7(a)(3)(A)(iv).
Id. § 299c-2(a)(2).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1181(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119,
728 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
278 42 U.S.C. § 299b-37(a)(2).
279 David J. Brailer, Guiding the Health Information Technology Agenda, 29 HEALTH AFF. 586,
586 (2010).
280 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11(b)(2),(8).
281 Id. § 300jj-11(c)(3).
282 Id. § 300jj-11(c)(1)(A),(C).
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“invest[s] funds through the different agencies with expertise,”283 thus leaving
authority with agencies outside the Office. Thus, real power remains with larger
HHS agencies such as CMS and the FDA.
There are two possible solutions to achieving coordination. First, the
Secretaries of HHS and Labor could create a task force with representatives
from Labor, the Agency, and the Office of the National Coordinator, with the
Institute playing an advisory role. The combined statutory authority I recite
above would provide this task force with the authority to direct information
collection prerogatives. Even if CMS distributes the incentive money, its role
would be mainly ministerial—the task force, with the authority of the
Secretary behind it, would determine how the money should be distributed.
Finally, Congress could combine the sometimes redundant functions of
the various HHS agencies with respect to data collection and research into a
single new agency. Only with this combined power could a coordinated research
initiative be created that respects equity across data collection programs.
CONCLUSION
Health information collection carries great promise for society, but
collection policies facilitate inequitable distribution of information burdens
and risks. Although other forces may head off this inequity, ethical regulation
would serve to distribute the burdens equitably across society to minimize
the encumbrances on the poor and elderly.
There are, of course, limits to the goal of equity. Sometimes equity will
not be technically feasible if we are to help certain underserved populations.
We must seek and use the information of those who are poor and elderly in
order to assist them. Indeed, while this Article focuses on the burdens of health
information collection and rendering them equitable, fairness also would
suggest that the benefits of collection and research should go to those who are
worse off, which is not always the case.284
Some may also object to the organizational approach I offer, which
appears to focus on government coordination, because of concerns arising
from security and political pragmatism. Yet, the government may be as well
or better placed to address security risk. As I note above, data can be stored in
multiple locations and can be linked for specific queries.285 The government
never holds on to the data itself.286 At the same time, a centralized government
283
284
285
286

Id. § 300jj-31(a).
See supra text accompanying notes 159–61.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FDA, supra note 262, at 2 (“Mini-Sentinel uses a distributed data approach in
which Data Partners retain control over data in their possession as a result of normal activities.”).
Most breaches occur due to human error. Private health care providers “experience frequent staff
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point of access can help us ensure that “only bona fide researchers can obtain
access . . . to preserve privacy and confidentiality.”287
These changes will not come about in a straightforward way. Equity
intersects with other values—autonomy in individual encounters, consent
requirements, and political and technological feasibility, to name a few. As
conversations progress, different visions of autonomy and solidarity, and
beneficence and benefit, will be tested. As these visions are deployed in
administrative and legislative crucibles, compromises, piecemeal, and
pluralistic policies will take shape. Data collection efforts will be stalled and
delayed. But in general, the result will be a system that best conforms to our
deepest ideals of justice in the distribution of obligation.
Stepping back to consider the ethics of health information collection at
the systemic level—rather than at that of individual encounters—reveals it to
be a site where visions of citizenship play out. Individuals and the community
mutually constitute and assist each other through this information. Bioethics
demands, and law must create, a system of just obligations that bind both
individuals and society to each other at the site of health information collection.

turnover, which results in a continual challenge of adequately educating” the staff. GROSSMAN ET
AL., supra note 262, at 195. Training workers in a single organization may be far easier than ensuring
that multiple entities meet training requirements. Further, providers have experienced breaches that
have been comparable to or worse than those of the government. Compare Sisi Wei & Charles
Ornstein, Over 1,400 Health Data Breaches, but Few Fines, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 27, 2015), https://
projects.propublica.org/graphics/healthcare-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/9WYM-TMLH]
(documenting 1419 large-scale data breaches within health care organizations and their business
partners from 2009 through 2015), with A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1019, 1027 (2009) (citing one study which documented “110 breaches of state
. . . federal, and military databases in 2008”). Indeed, the rate at which government entities suffer
breaches has declined. See id. at 1027 n.35 (noting that there has been a fifty percent drop in reported
breaches of U.S. government data from 2006 through 2009). Further, “those who aggregate and
mine [big] data neither view their informational assets as public goods held on trust nor seem
particularly interested in protecting the privacy of their data subjects.” Terry, Protecting Patient
Privacy, supra note 11, at 389. Indeed, “[t]he truth lies in the opposite because the big data business
model is selling information about their data subjects.” Id. Some others contend that the big data
business model is even using data to discriminate. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 163, at 108 n.43
(“There are also legitimate worries about discriminatory uses of information either not covered by
existent privacy or anti-discrimination laws, or undetectable by workers.”).
287 Donna M. Gitter, The Challenge of Achieving Open Source Sharing of Biobank Data, in
COMPARATIVE ISSUES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH BIOBANKS 165, 185 (Giovanni
Pascuzzi et al. eds., 2013). Many suggest that smaller, decentralized data holding might be less
secure: one argument is that “no individual company will ever have the level of security and keep
up with the arms race” like bigger, more centralized repositories. Lucas Mearian, Hackers Are Coming
for Your Healthcare Records—Here’s Why, CSO ONLINE (July 1, 2016, 4:24 AM), http://www.
csoonline.com/article/3090553/security/hackers-are-coming-for-your-healthcare-records-heres
-why.html [https://perma.cc/M73A-N5N7].

